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The article reviews the confused state of innocent spouse law and
considers whether the innocent spouse rules can permit a wife to escape
taxes on her own income, whether the rules are skewed to prevent
women who are still married from obtaining relief, and whether the
inconsistencies in the Tax Court's decisiorza_llaw may in part be attributable to an unconscious predisposition in favor of the traditional wife and
against the educated and independent married woman.

Introduction
The law that permits women to be taxed on the income of their
husbands, 1 and even their ex-husbands, 2 has been in effect so long (fiftytwo years) that it no longer seems extraordinary (at least to tax pr0fessionals3), despite it~ obvious unfairness. The rule was unjustified when
originally enacted, 4 and it remains unjustified today. 5 It is highly discrimi-
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1
Section 6013(d) requires joint and several liability of the spouses if they elect to file jointly.
Approximately 99 percent of married taxpayers file jointly each year because filing separately
usually results in a higher tax.
·
2
The effect of this situation is as if the ms intervened in the couple. s property settlement (by
which it is not bopnd) in order to redistribute wealth from the ex-wife to her ex-husband. The
amount of such retransfers is limited only by the size of the ex-husband's tax delinquency and
bears no relation to th.e ex-wife's ability to pay. The ms in under no requirement to pursue the
husband first.
3
It appears that very few people are aware or have any reason to be aware of this assumption
of liability until it is too late. There is no warning on Form 1040. Nor does it appear that preparers
or divorce lawyers genetally take thiS' liability into acccunt.
4
The rule of joint re tmn liability was first enacted in 1938 in order to reverse the result in
Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'g 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933) (taxpayer's cardinal
right to be taxed only according to his own ability to pay unaffected by joint filing). The government's position in Cole was that because joint returns do not explicitly set forth the respective
separate incomes and deductions of the spouses, without joint liability it would be unable to
determine the amount each spouse should pay. The argument was not only incorrect and irrelevant
to the case at bar where the respective pet incomes of the Coles were stipulated, but also may even
have been made in bad faith. The Treasury was already making precisely the same deienninations
when it was for its own benefit (e.g., in order to limit each taxpayer's loss ·carryovers to and from
joint return years so as to offset only that spouse's separate net income, and in order to prevent
each spouse's charitable deductions and losses from offsetting income of the other spouse (under
then regulations)). This purported administrative necessity was the only reason put forth in the
committee reports when Congress enacted the predecessor of § 60 13(d) in 1938 in order to reverse

Cole.

·

5

Contrary to widely held belief, joint return liability cannot be justified as the price one must
pay for lower tax rates on joint returns. The favorable tax rates for joint returns computed by

3
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natory against woroen. 6 The worst effects of joint retunlliability developed in the 1960s when the IRS began to apply the rule aggressively
against separated and divorced women. This application seems not to
have been foreseen at the time of enactment. When the unfairness of
the rule became apparent, Congress responded in 1971 by enacting the
innocent spouse rules, which provide only very limited relief. Congress
should have reconsidered the rule of joint return liability instead and
should have repealed the rule as unfair and unjustified, as all other
industrialized countries that ever had such a rule have done.
In addition to the many intrinsic defects of the innocent spouse rules,
they have bad the unfortunate effect of distracting attention from the
unfairness of the underlying joint retum liability itself.' Attention to the
need for further reform has been focused on the innocent spouse rules
instead, which have already been amended twice but remain and will
always remain unsatisfactory. This analysis of the illogic and inadequacy
of the innocent spouse rules and of the eJiors and prejudices that the Tax
Court has imported into their application does not conclude that the
defects 1n the innocent spouse rules should be coJiected but that, because
they seem incapable of correction, joint retum liability roust be repealed.
The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have
announced their disagreement over a point of law in two cases concerning

income.~plitting were not introduced untill948 , some ten years after the enactment of joint return

liabilitY. lncome spliuing was not enacted to reward me assumption of joint reru.m liabilitY but to
equalize lhe taX burden between common-law stateS and eommunity-property states. Joint returns
were introduced in 1918. apparently for the sole pllf?OSe of convenience both for taxpayers and
for the government, without any thought of special rates or privileges for married persons . More·
over, the right of spouses to offset (!eductions and Jpsses against eaah other's income and gains
had been available to taXPayers from 1918 untl\1938 without the price of joint and several liability.
The quid pro quo justification for joint rerum liability is as weak logiciiUy as it is historically.
The t.BX advantage from filing jointlY is quite modest. The siu,: of the benefits bears no relation to
the joint reuun liability assumed, which may be unlimited in amount. The benefit explanation
cannot justify joint liabiltiy for an amount greater than the taX saving from filing jointly. rinally,
me benefits usually inure \0 the husband while the liability almost always is bome by me wife.
Joint retum liability is not only unfair in principle. but it also is highly discriminatory against
women in fact . For an
analysis urging repeal of§ 6013(d), see Beck, ''The I nnocent
Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed ,": 4"1 Vand .

e~ttendeQ

It .is317
even
queStionable
whether there is a nne advantage ftOm joint filing in. the frrst place.
( 1990)
.
L . Rev
The advantage exists only when compared with the punitive rates applicable to married persons
filing separately. See Rosen , "'The Marriage Tax Is Down But Not Out," 40 Nat'\ Tax l. 567,
The
stllrute is gender neutral on its face , but it appears that over 90 percent of the victims
573-574
( 1987).
6
of joint
retum liabilitY are women. When me liability is asserted against separated and divorced
women. as it apparently is in .more man \0,000 cases per year, it strikes them at a time when they

~innocence"

at their lowest
.
may be
' Similarly.
the point financially
teSt under
the relief rnles almost seems to have had me perverse
effeCt of creating a pseudojustification for joint return liability: The wife may now be said to incur

relief of women from the tax liabilities of their husbands: Bokum v.
Comm 'r 8 and Price v. Comm 'r. 9 Surprisingly, the outcome seems wrong
in both. What is still more surprising in these opinions, however, is a
lengthy and an · explicit analysis of what appears to be a point of
law-namely, that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." Such legal
analysis is a rare event in innocent spouse cases because the courts decide
these cases on the facts and have a larg~ arsenal of rules or factors to
apply in order to reach whatever conclusion seems appropriate, including
a rule of "equity under the circumstances." Ordinarily, there is little
occasion to analyze the law of innocence and very little occasion for
courts to disagree about the law.
It is even more surprising that (I) this lengthy disagreement over the
law involved two situations of fact that could hardly have been more
different, (2) both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have precedents
or subsequent dedsions that contradict their own stated positions, and (3)
neither court could quite make up its mind as to whether there really is a
disagreement over the law in the ftrst place.
As this discussion unfolds, there will be occasion to note that many
decisions and even some of the Tax Court's rules themselves seem
explicable only by supposing that unexpressed attitudes of the Tax Court
toward women and marriage have played a significant role in the decisional law. 10 There is an unmentioned but unmistakable reluctance to
grant relief to a woman who is still married at the time of trial. There
also seems to be an unspoken and probably unconscious preference for
the dutiful and dependent wife in the traditional family, as opposed to the
educated and successful married woman. 11 Many of the inconsistencies in
the decisional law (including the contradictions surrounding the Bokum
and Price decisions) seem explicable only in light of these tendencies.
In Bokum, the Tax Court majority reaffirmed its long-standing interpretation of the innocence (or "reason to know") test under Section
liability through her own "fault"- namely, her failure to prove that she had no reason to know of
lhe husband's tax understatement-rather than solely because of lhe arbitrary rule of§ 6013(d).
'94 T.C. No. 11 (1990). Bokum is a reviewed decision, split ten judges to five, with two
dissenting and two concurring opinions.
9
887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989) , rev'g an unpublished Tax Court opinion.
10
The inherent vagueness of the innocence and equity tests has provided the Tax Court with
extraordinarily great discretionary power and has resulted in a correspondingly great inconsistency
in the case law.
11
The principal pUIJlOse of this aspect of the discussion is not to perform a feminist deconstruction to expose unconscious gender stereqtyping, and no effort is made to prove these assertions as
such or to develop them as a <;omprehensive explanation of the case law. The purpose is to explain
a number of inconsistencies in the decisional law.
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6013(e)(l)(C), according to which the wife's knowledge of the existence
of a transaction without knowledge of its tax consequences is sufficient
to preclude innocent spouse protection. 1n Bokum. the wife knew that her
husband's S corporation sold a ranch and made a distribution to him but
did not know how the transaction was (or should have been) reported,
much less that her husband bad improperly deducted his stock basis from
the dividend. The retum was prepared by a certifted public accountant
(CPA) , and she did not read it. She was found to bave reason to know of
the resulting understatement of tax on the couple's joint return despite
her ignorance of the tax consequences of the transaction, and sbe was
therefore held liab1e for the deficiency . The Bokums were very wealthy
and were still living together at the time of the trial.
The Tax Court's dissenting opinions seem correct in pointing out that
Ms. Bokum had no reason to inquire into her husband' s tax treatment of
an otherwise perfectly legitimate transaction and that to require her to do
so would in effect require wives to obtain a second professional tax
opinion in all cases .
The Bokum decision is in large part the Tax Court's answer to the
Ninth Circuit,which bad reversed the Tax Court four months earlier on
the same question of law in Price. In Price , the wife was aware of the
husband's large (and completely meritless) tax-shelter deduction, but
because the court found that she reasonably believed the deduction was
legitimate, she was held to have no reason to know of the resultirtg
12
understatement and was relieved of liability. According to the Ninth
Circuit, mere knowledge of the existence of the transaction is not by 1tself
sufficient to preclude relief; there must in addition be some basis for a
wife to suspect that the joint tax may have been understated.
The Ninth Circuit's rule seems more reasonable, but the decision
itself seems wrong because (unlike Bokum) it was the transaction itself
that was phony, not merely its tax treatment; moreover, the only factual
basis forMs. Price's reasonable belief was that she said (in uncorroborated
testimony) that she asked her then husband, who was a tax-shelter promotor, if the deduction was legitimate, and that he assured her it was.
The Tax Court's reason for choosing the unlikely vehicle of Bokum
to challenge the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the law appears to be
that it wished to go on record as soon as possible to disavow the Ninth
" The wife was

apparent\~

relieved of tax liability for /wr own lnc:ome as well because she

eame~ S'21 .000 of1.ne.\ r S\00 ,000 ioint incomes , which was oft'sel 1:>~ the husband's $90,000 taX·

sbe\ter deducion . 'This \e.Sull is ah~md, 'out arg,\lll.o\)' a1 \east , it seems to !o\1ow t>om me Matute .
Thi>. rna~ be ;m additiona\ rea.-on \or me \a1<.· Court's reaction to Price.

Circuit's result. There are many tax-shelter (and other abusive) cases still
awaiting decision, and the Tax Court apparently foresaw disaster if all
wives, even the wife of a tax-shelter promotor, could escape liability by
so simple a device as the invention of a story to match that of Ms. Price. 13
It will be argued below that the Ninth Circuit's stated view of the law
and that of the dissenting judges in Bokum are better grounded in the
statute and in common sense. 14 But there is both less and more to this
apparent conflict than might first appear. The Tax Court has never applied
its stated view of the law with any consistency; in fact, the case law is
so confused that the judges cannot even agree as to whether there really
is a conflict here. The muddle cannot be blamed solely on poorly analyzed
judicial positions (which, if they could be formulated with any clarity,
could be resolved by higher authority) or even on the vagueness of the
statute (which could be more tightly drafted if Congress had a clear idea
of what it wanted).
The ultimate source of the problem is that the rule of joint return
liability is unjustifiable in the first place and does not rest upon any
coherent policy or principle. Because the liability is founded solely upon
statutory flat rather than on guilt (or any other defensible principle), any
form of statutory relief that is based on innocence is misconceived, no
matter how innocence is defined or interpreted. 15

Innocent Spouse Rules
Spouses who elect to file a joint return become jointly and severally
liable under Section 6013(d) for the entire tax due. 16 The law provided
no exceptions from 1938 until1971 when Congress enacted the innocent
spouse rules in response to some particularly harsh decisions of the Tax
13
11 ls unclear why 1he Ninth Circurt chose to reverse the Tax Court although il should be
nmed that il has never decided against the taxpayer in an innocent spouse case. Perhaps irs
application of good law to these unlikely facts is an intentional nullification of joint rerum liabil ity
·
altogether.
14
The Ninth Circurt's stated version of the law is also misleading. however. Ms. Price should
have lost because her knowledge of the surrounding circumstances of the tax shelter apparently
included sufficient information to put her on notice that its treatment was doubtful under the lax
Jaw. Reasonable ignorance of the law should be a good defense, contrary 10 the 'slatemems of both
courts.
15
Innocence is illogical and inappropcia1e as a basis for relief becaUse the wife has no
preex.istlng and independently justifiable duty io certify th_e accuracy of her husband's tax items.
The lRS canno1 p'Jausibly cla:im that it relies on the wife's signature as such certification as if she
were an auditor, and for that reason , it makes no real difference to the government's interest
whether the wife is innocent or noL
16
The wife is l iable for penalties (other than fraud) as well unless she qualifies as an innocent
spouse. See, e.g., Norgaard v. Co'mm'r, 57 T.C.M. 1122 ( 1989).
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Court in which wives were held liable for huge amounts of tax (together
with penalties for fraud 17) on their husbands' embezzlements, even though
they did not know of the concealed income and did not profit from it, as
in Scudder v. Comm 'r. ts
The innocent spouse rules exempt a spouse from joint return liability
if shet 9 proves that (l) a joint return has been filed (Section
6013(e)(l)(A)); (2) the return contained a substantial understatement
of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of her husband (Section
6013(e)(l)(B)); (3) in signing the return, she did not know and had no
reason to know of the understatement (Section 6013(e)(l)(C)); and (4)
taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold
her liable for the deficiency attributable to the understatement (Section
6013(e)(l)(D)). 20 The burden of proof as to all items is on the petitioner
21

for relief, and she must prove each element.
T.he relief rules were narrowly drafted to do little more than provide
statutory authority for the Sixth Circuit's ad hoc approach in Scudder.
Congress gave little. if any, thought to other situations in which relief

!iabl~:

" Since the Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, a wife is -no longer
for the fraud penalty
unless the IRS can prove some fraud on her part.l.R.C. § 6663(c). The wife is not protected by
the return remains open forever. LR .C.
the statute of limitntions if her husband committed
§ 650t(c)O). See, e.g., Ballard v. Comm'r, 740 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'g on other grounds

frau~

44 T .C.M.
405 &29
F .2d(1982).
222 (6th Cir. 1968),

rev'g 48 T .C. 36 (1967). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
11 reversed several such Tax Court decisions, beginning wiU:LScudder, on lhc inventive theory
Circuit
that if the wife did-not knoW of the
income and did not. profit from it, she could. not have
intended to assent to the joint return election as to the embeuled inco!llll. Her election was, in
effect, procured by the husband's fraud and thus void as to such items. See Sharwell v . Comm'r,
419 P .2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Huetsman v. Comm'r, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
' Th.e noneaming spouse seeking relief will be referred to as the "wife." The statute is gender
9
neutral,
but its effects are not. The vast majority of victims of jaint return liability are women. Of
the sb:.teen reported cases litigating§ 60'13(e) in 1990 (until this article went to press), all petitioners
were womt:Il, and of the twenty-four cases in 1989, twenty-one were women.
lll The teSts apply conjunctively so that a wife may be taX-ed if she bad reason to knoW even
if she received no benefit. See Shapiro v. Comm' r, 51 T.C.M. 818 {1986); &tate of Jackson v.
Comm'r, 72 T.C. 356 (1979). The reverse also occurs sometimes, but rarely, where a wife is
found to have no reason to \mow but loses on the benefit or equity test. See Quave v. Comm' r, 49

conceal~

T.C.M.
(1985).constitutes an absurd but expticit statutory invitation to make decisions that are
This445
situation
inequ.itable. lt is unclear why a wife should be taXed when a coun has specifically found that such
taxation is inequitable merely because she bns reason to know of her husband's taX understatement.
It amounts
to imposing
lllX on
state ofthe
mind.
It would
be much afairer
to aimpOse
lllX only if there were both a significant benefit and
reason to knoW of its untaxed source. Benefit alone should not trigger taxation (unless tranSferee
liability applies) becaUse this unfairly discriminates against her as compared with other beneficiaries
of the husband's generosity. Children , parents, and even an adulterous girlfriend can benefit from
gifts withaut risk of taxabillty (unless transferee liability applies) even with reason to believe the

gifts derive from untaxed income.

:u See Shea v. Comm'r, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986).

should be granted. As a result, the innocent spouse rules are very restrictive in many respects. 22 On the other hand, the innocence and the equity
tests are so open-ended that they have allowed enorinous, and perhaps
excessive, judicial discretion. 23 The result had been a great volume of
litigation (there are well over 300 reported decisions) but little predictability as to the outcome in any given case.
Joint Return Test
The best defense is that the wife did not file a joint return at all and
is, therefore, exempt from all liability under Section 6013(d). Whether
she filed jointly is a question of fact, and it is her intent that controls.
She need not sign the return, or even give express authorization to her
husband. If the circumstances indicate tacit consent on her part, the return
is joint. 24
Substantiality Test
Whether an understatement is substantial is deternrined under Sections
6013(e)(3) and 6013(e)(4). For omissions of income, relief is restricted
to items totaling over $500 (exclusive of penalties and interest). For
erroneous claims of deduction, credit, or basis, the items must in addition
meet some percentage-of-income_ requirements apparently designed to
~ These restrictions principally involve the dollar limitations, the linritati.on to grossly
erroneous items, and the petitioner's heavy burden of proof. As to these rules , at least, the
commentators are unanim.ously agreed that the rules foreclose relief in many deserving cases and
should be liberalized in various ways. See Borison, "Innocent Spouse Relief: A Call for Legislative
and Judicial Liberalization," 40 Tax Law. 819 (1987). See also Goldstein, ''The Innocent Spouse
Act,~ 45 Temple L.Q. 448 (1972); Lax, "The Innocent SpoUSe Provision Under Section 6013(e)
of the Internal Revenue Code: Relief or Refuse?'' 12 U. Ark.- Linle Rock L.J. 25 (1989); Panny
& Faust, "The Innocent Spouse Provision of the Internal Revenue Code: In Search of Equity," 32
U. Miami L. Rev. 137 (1977); Phillips & Braford, "Even a Tax Collector Should Have Some
Heart; Equitable Relieffor the Innocent Spouse Under lRC Sec. 6013(e)," 8 N. ill. L. Rev . 33
(1987); Quick & DuCanto, "Joint Tax Liability and the 'Innocent Spouse' Doctrine in Common
Law and Community Property Jurisdictions: A Review of Code I.R.C. § 6013(e) and its Progeny,
Section 66," 17 Fam. L.Q. 65 (1983); Note, "The Innocent Spouse Rule: Recent Developments
and Proposed Changes," 14 Sw. 1J.L. Rev. 129 (198.3).
23
See Lax, 11ote 22 supra.
"See In re Dolores Graham,Eankr. No. 88-12174F (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (tacit consent
presumed from the fact that in 1984 sbe gave her husband (from whom she bad been separoted
slnce· l977) five yean' worth of taX Jnforrnation enabling hlin to file delinquent returns in J984).
It is painfully obvious that he~ the wife had no irikling of the liability tha.t she was to incur through
filing jointly. For a similar instance of accidental tax suicide, see Trimmer v. Conun'r, 45 T .C.M.
960 (1983); Greenmanv. United States, 711 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Urbanski v . Comm'r,
52 T .C.M. 1032 (1986) . But see Qnlnt v. Comm'r, 49 T .C.M . 1465 (1985) (wife exonerated
though she knew of husband's defalcations when she signed because she believed funds were
repaid) .
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measure the wife's present ability to pay. If the wife' s adjusted gross
income (AGI) for the year immediately preceding the date on which the
deficiency notice is mailed (the "preadjustment year") is $20,000 or less,
her liability (inclusive of penalties and interest up to , but not after, the
date of deficiency notice 25) for such items must exceed 10 percent of
such AG1, and if her AGI for the preadjustment year is more
man $20 ,000,
6
such items must exceed 25 percent of such
For purposes of
determining the wife's AGI in tbe preadjustrnent year if she has remarried,1
she must include her new husband' s AGl, even if they do not file jointly ?
The unfairness of this rule scarcely needs comment.

AGL~

Attribution Test
The determination whether an erroneous item is attributable to the
husband ordinarily causes no diffjculty. 28 Under Section 6013(e)(S), the
determination is made without regard to community-property law, except
for gross income from property. Community-property law, in California
and Texas at least, will not impute ownership of a tax.-sbelter from
husband to wife where the husband's tax-shelter deduction does not create
any actual loss . In such circumstances, the claimed loss is not attributable
to the wife and will not bar relief.

29

Grossly Erroneous Items
Relief is limited to items that are grossly erroneous. A correct return
on which the tax is unpaid will not qualify for relief. 1n effect, relief is
limited to items of negligence or fraud. An item of omitted income is
grossly erroneous per se. Until the revisions of the Tax Return Act of
1984 (TRA '84), only omitted income quatified for relief. The 1984
amendments extended relief to items of deduction, credit, or basis but
only for such claims that are "in an amount for which there is no basis in
fact or law ."

30

~ Farmer
v. Comm'r, 794 F.2d. 1163 (6th Cir. !986).
All these dollar limitations seem arbitrarY and unfair and shoUld be repealed, as several
16
commentators
have argued . See, e.g ., Borison, note 22 supra, at 863. All dollar lirnitarions have •
been repealed in California's version of the innocent spouse rules for California state income ta:>t
purposes.

• 7 I.R.C.
§ 6013(e)(4){D
This. despite
the fact ).
that a purported "difficulty" in detenni.ning which items are whose
on a 25joint retUrn was the only reason ever offered by the government for imposing joint retlll1l

liability
in the
first place.
See note
'l!l See
Bouskos
v. Comm'r
, 544Tsupra
.C.M.. lll7 (1987) (California); Estate of Killian v. Comm'r,

53 T.C.M . 1438 (1987) ('fe:r.as).
JO

l .R .C. § 6013{e){2)(B).

Items that are not omissions of income or claims of deduction, basis,
or credit remain ineligible for relief. Such ineligible items ·have included
an erroneous exclusion reported on the retum, 31 adjustments for an improper method of income averaging, failure to characterize income as
subject to the tax on self-employment, 32 and failure to compute the
alternative minimum tax. 33 There is no policy reason for excluding such
items from relief.
No Basis in Fact or Law
There is no defirution f01; the phrase "no basis in fact or law ," although
the committee reports provide some guidance by using the phrase "phony
business deductions" as an example. 34 It is clear that deductions for
amounts that were never paid will qualify. It is also clear that mere
disallowance of a deduction, without more, wil1 not qualify .35 Not much
else is clear, however, except that measuring degrees of nondeductibility
will prove troublesome. There is already an apparent split between the
Sixth and the Eighth Circuits as to whether a worthless stock loss claimed
for the wrong year is "without basis infactorlaw ." 36 InBelk v. Comm'r, 37
a $2 mjllion long-term capital loss improperly carried forward from 1974
to 1976, which was in effect duplicative of earlier losses, was held to be
grossly erroneous, but a $1 mjllion loss carried forward to 1981 as a
protective measure in case earlier losses were disallowed was not grossly
erroneous because it would have had some merit in case of disallowance
of the earlierlosses. A $1,500 loss claimed as $15,000 by clerical mistake
had no basis in fact or law.
Investment interest deductjons disallowed under Section 163(d) were
held to have some basis m fact and law in In re Butcher 38 because the
interest was actually paid, and because there was a colorable Corn Products argument for treatment as a trade or business expense. 39 On the other
Hayes v. Comm'r, 57 T.C .M. 869 {1989).
" Sivils v. Comm'r. 86 T.C. 79 (1986).
" Est.ate of Smunons v. Con'ml 'r , T.C. No. 120-89 (May 2. 1990).
:l4 See H . Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong. , 2d Sess. , pt. 2, at 1502 (1984).
l> Douglas v. Camm'r, 86 T.C. 758 ( 1986) (widow denied relief because ·d~eased husband
left no records that co uld support claim of no basis in fact or law for his deductions; mere
disallowance inrufficient). See Neary v. Cornm'r, 50 T.C.M. 4 (1985).
•• Compare Purcell v. Comm'r , 826F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987) (relief disallowed because there
WI!S some arguable factual and legal basis for worthlessness in year claimed) , with Shenker v.
Cornm'r, 804 F.2d 109 (Slh Cir. 1986) (relief allowed because evidence was clear that siock had
som~ value until the following year).
17
93 T.C. 434 (1989).
30
!00 Bankr. 363 ( 1989).
~ Cf. Reid v. Comm'r, 57 T.C .M. 723 {1989) (farme('s conunodiry future losses had basis
in fact and law although incorrectly .reponed as ordinary. rather than capital) .
Jl

INNOCENT SPOUSE IN THE TAX COURT

13

THE REVIEW OF TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS

12

hand, deductions for interest owed that was not paid but rolled over into
the principal indebtedness , were held to be without foundation in fact or
40

law in Bell v . Comm 'r.
Abusive tax-shelter hosses generally clear this hurdle,41as in the Price
case , but not all shelters do . In [AMothe v. Cornm'r, for example ,
because 56 percent of the deceased husband's tax-shelter losses were
allowed by an IRS appeals officer and 44 percent were disallowed, the
compromise was held to show that the disallowed losses had some basis
42
in fact and law, and the widow was denied relief. Even total disallowance of a tax-shelter loss may not qualify if the law was so uncertain that
courts disagreed on the merits of the deduction. Thus, in Bokum v.
Comm'r 43 (an unrelated tax-shelter case involving the same Bokums),
handed down less than two months before Bokum, a disallowed deduction
of over $4 million was held not to be "grossly erroneous" on the ground
that the Tax Court had allowed similar deductions in tax-shelter litigation
involving substantially identical facts before its reversal by the Courts of
44
Appeals for the First and Third Circuits
.
45
Similarly, in Foster v. Comm 'r , a charitable contribution to the
Church of Scientology for auditing and training se.rvices that was totally
disallowed was held to have some foundation in fact and in law where
circuit courts of appeal had previously allowed similar deductions , but
the U. S. Supreme Court finally ruled that such deductions were not gifts.
Whipsaw
It is obviously difficult for widows and divorcees lacking access to
their husbands' records to prove anything with respect to their husbands'
deductions, either to substantiate them or prove them to be without basis
in fact or law. 46 Sometimes a wife has tried to do both in different stages
of the same litigation. In Bokum (here and hereafter the second decision)
56T .C.M. 1467 (1989).
41 58 T.C.M. 1358 (1990).
The widow also lost on the ground that she benefited because if the husband had Jived, he
42
would have paid the deficiency out of funds that she !lad inherited from him.
43 58 T .C.M. 11 83 (1990).
Ms . Bokurn also lost for failure to prove that the deficiency exceeded 25 percent of her
40

44

AGI for the preadjustment year . The isSues of equicy and reason to know were not considered.
4' T .C. Memo . 1990·34-5.
.,; See, e .g., Douglas v . Cornm' r, &6 T .C. 758 (1 986); Neary , SO T.C .M. at 4. For that
reason , among others, the .requirement of no basis in fact or in law should be repealed so that any
disallowed claim. is eligible for relie£. See Borison, note 22 supra, at 854 . A wife may sometimes
be forced to pay mx.es for a disallowed deduction that the husband might have been able to contest
successfully . 'This result can occur because the burden of proof is always on the petitioner and the

IRS 's assessment enjoys the presumption of correctness.

the wife argued both that her husbands' basis in his stock was higher than
allowed by the IRS in an earlier stipulation and that it was grossly
erroneous for him to offset his basis in any amount against his dividend
distribution. These apparently contradictory positions led the IRS to
contend, unsuccessfully, that she should be estopped from claiming innocent spouse status with respect to the basis item. It is the statute itself
that puts petitioners in this awkward position, and if estoppel were to
apply, a wife could not defend a deduction at all without abandoning her
right to an innocent spouse defense if she loses.

Income or Deduction?
It is not always obvious whether an item is a deduction or an omissionY In Purcell v. Comm'r,48 some proceeds of a sale of stock were
reallocated to a noncompete agreement, which resulted in a recharacterization of long-term capital gain to ordinary income. The adjustment was
assumed by the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit to be an item of omitted
income from the noncompete clause and thus grossly erroneous per se.
But, in Bokum, a reallocation of proceeds of a sale of assets from land to
depreciable property that resulted in a recharacterization of capital gain
to Section 1245 ordinary income at the S corporation level was held to
be an item of deduction at the shareholder level on the ground that it was
a disallowance of the (then) Section 1202 deduction for long-term capital
gains. The Bokum majority reached that conclusion by pointing out that
"the mischaracterization adj ustment . . . does n ot add an item or an
amount that had been omitted from gross income " (emphasis in original)
because the total amount of gross income was in fact reported.49
The issue seems identical to that of the noncompete agreement, but
the conflict with Purcell was not mentioned, even though the Bokum
majority cited Purcell for another issue in the same discussion. The
47
In Flynn v. Comm'r (93 T.C. 355 (1 989)), the Tax. Court he!d that for years preceding the
enactment of the Subchapter S Revision Act of !982, to the extent that disallowance of an S
Corporation's deduction produces gross income at the shareholder level under pre-1982 Section
1373, such income is omitted income at the shareholder level , which automatically qualifies it as
grossly erroneous . I.R .C. § 60 13(e)(2)(A). If, on the other hand , such disallowance createS (or
increases) a loss at the shareholder level, the loss must be tested under Section 6013(e)(2)(B) and
found to be "without fou ndation lnfact or law" in order to qualify as grossly erroue<1us. P~:esumab ly,
all S corporation losses passed through under cUJ:rent Section 1366 (after the Subchapter S Re\•ision
Act) must be tes'ted under Section 60!3(e)(2)( B) in the same way as partnership losses.
ill &26 F.2d at 470 .
9
"' The recapwre items then failed the grossly erro11eous test because th.ey were an error
involving less than 5 percent of the total sales price and were therefore not "ftivolous , fraudule nt,
or phony."
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Does the Common-Law Doctrine of Marital Unity Survive?

Purcell rreatment is arguably more correct as a technical matter (although
the issue is far from clear) because , although no amount of gross income
was omitted in either situation, an item (of ordinary dividend income)
does seem to have been omitted , and the statute uses the latter term. The
50

Bokum court glosses over this distinction.

The Equity Test
Under the equity test, the wife must prove that, under all the facts and
circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold her liable. The principal
question is whether the wife benefited from the understatement over and
above ordinary support. 51 Other factors that have been taken into account
52
are whether there would be financial hardsbip, whether the wife has
been deserted or divorced ,53 and whether the husband himself was
"innocent." 54 One judge aptly characterized the equity test as "factual
and subjective." 55 Some of the most important factual aspects are the
least discussed in the cases, however.
"' The § 1202 deduction seems not to be so much disallowed as reduced in proportion to the
reduction of capital gain recognized, which is itself en adjustment that
only afrer and as an
offset to the recognition of an additional \tern of income. On the other hand, it is undeniable that
the § t202 deduction was disallowed ani:! th.at the disallowance caused the deficiency . Sivils (86
T.C. at 79) and Esrare of Simmons (T.C. No. 120-89) are arguably support for the Bokiun
eoun's position to the extent a mischa.racteriwrlon of fully reponed income as not subje<:t to selfemployment tax or ;lltematlve minimllm tax may be similar issues. Also. as a policy mauer . the
Bokwn court was perhaps correct. The policy underlying the different treatment for omissions and
deductions under § 60 l3(e) is probably similar to the reason for the extended s\lltute of limitations
under§ 650l(e) for substantial omissions ofincome-vit .. that less auditing is required tO discover
erroneous deductions that are visible on the return than omissions of which the wifelgovernrnent
may have no notice at alL The language is different under § 650 \(e), however, which speakS of

occu~

omission of an amoulll· of gross income. ra1he r than an item.
The problem is thar the reallocations are b01h omis>ions and deductions at the same time and
the drafters of the innocent spouse rule.s did not foresee the issue.
.SI TRA '84 deleted from the statute the requirement that the wife not have received ·any
significant benefit, directly or indirectly. but the Comminee Report indicated that "this factor
should continue to be taken into account." H.R . Rep. No. 432 . note 34 s11pra .
e.g .• Dakil v . Cornm'r. 496 F.2d 431 (lOth Cir. 1974) (widow of wealthy physician
exonerated despite uncertainty whether she bad significantly benefited during marriage).
>l Reg. § 1.6013-(S)(b): see Mysse v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 680 (1972) .
•• See McCoy v. Comrn·r, 5'7 T.C. 732 ( 1972). There would appear to be no statutory warrant
iorconsidering the husband's gulltor innocence. bUI the case law reveals this to be a critical factor .
For a rare (ifn.ot unique) explicit statement. see Purcell . 826 E.2d at 470, 475: "rr'Jhe purpose of
the innocent spouse rule ls to prorect one spouse from the overreaching or di£honesty of the other."
This statement reflects the origins of the statute as a reac-tion to the Scudder decision, but it seems

~See.

unsuppc:ned
anythlng
stawte as
s Judgeby
Fay
in Gurrinv.the
Comm'r,
35 drafted
T.C.M.. 1551 (1976). Judge Korner repUted the phrase
(with acknowledgment) but referred this time to all the elements of innocent spouse relief in Guave
v. Comm'r, 49 T .C .M. 445 l1985) . As will be seen. th:is is no UJ\derstatement of the situation.

Perhaps the most important fact is whether the wife is still living with
her husband. Judges seem reluctant to grant relief where the petitioner is
still married 56 probably because they fear that the husband indirectly will
profit if his wife is permitted to keep her property. 57 Also, while it is
clear that the Tax Court approves of a wife who stands by her man, it
may feel that sharing his joys and sorrrows should include paying his
taxes. 58 But these issues are never discussed in the cases 59 perhaps because
there is no apparent statutory warrant for it. 60

s• Of the nineteen persons petitioning for relief in 1989 and 1990 who were stlll married at
the time of trial (all women), only one obtained any relief, and her relief was granted only in part.
See Portillo v. Comm'r. 58 T .C.M. 1386 (1990). By contrast. of the other twenty petitioners who
were divorced or widowed at the time of tri!!l, nine wan and deven ·lost. fn Bokum (94 T.C. No.
I I), the wife was st.ill married and had been continuously married for forty-nine yea~. The rule
that ignorance of the law is no excuse seems to owe its existence to the Tax Court's reluctance w
allow relief to a still-married woman in McCoy (57 T .C. at 732), discussed at pp. 25--28 infra.
07 The rare examples of wives still living with their husbands who ~ucceed in obtaining relief
u_sually involve financ.ial hardship or other or especially sympathetic circumstances. See Sbapolsky
v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. 260 (1972): VotSis v. Comm 'r , 55 T.C.M. 175 (1988); Quint, 49 T.C-1\.1 .
1465; DeMartino v. Comm'r, 51 T .C.M. 127S (1986). Cf. Coleman v, Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. 711
( 1988) (wife of physician. he~elf a physician. relieved of husband's fraudulently concealed income
even though she had done temporary bookkeepi11g for him and even though at time of signing 1980
·rettrm she already knew of IRS investigation of ftaudu,lent concealment for earlier years. and of
omissions from 1980 deposits journal, which be admitted to her and instructed her to correct by
giving accountant a list of cash deposits). The court noted that the couple's conduct during trial
indicated that they were happily married, but from posnrial motions. the court and wife were both
surprised to le<\fll that the husband had already secretly begun divorce proceedings at the time of
trial . One suspects that Coleman might have gone the other way if this fact ltad not come to light
before the decision was made.
sa See Walker v. Cornm'r, SO T.C.M . 105 (1985), where the husband, a poOrly educared
grocery clerk, relied on his wife in all f:mancial matters "because he loved her and because she had
a better education." The wife misappropriated money from her employer in amountS equal to hal!
again and double her salary each year over a period of years . When the wife was caught, she lost
her job. and they had to give up all the property that they had acquired by way of restitution tO her
employer. They were 60 years old at the time of trial, they had been IIIHITied for thiny years, and
their sole suppon was Jake's wages at the .supermarket. It is clear th:u sympathy for Jake and
concern for his financial plight moved the court. Since the couple had lost all its property, the IRS
apparently intended to levy upon Jake's meager wages. The court kept them off we.lfare and llli!de
him. finally, the head of the family . See also Moskovitz v. Comm'r. 52 T .C.M. 98 (1986).
'~The cases are sometimes -not even clear as to whether the petitioner is in fact divorced.
separated, or still living with her husband. Portillo v. Corrun'r, 44 T.C.M. tOSS ( 1982). is one
such case. and it may not be an exception after all to the general observation that married women
lose.
00
Although Reg . § 1 .60 13-5(b) !s arguably some authority. it is not clear whether desertion
and divon:;e are to be considered simply from the point of view of establishing the wife's economic
hardship or whether the husband's possible unjust economic gain is a potential factor as well. It is
the latter that seems imporumt in the ease law because a remarri.ed woman sometimes fare.s well .
See, e.g. , McRae v. Comm'r. 55 T .C.M . 156o (1988) (divorced and ~married housewife and
mother who did not read rerums or ask questions not liable for $90 ,000 of deficiencies although
she received over $200,000 worth of property ar divorce).
·
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The attitude reflected in the decisional law could almost be described
as a vestige of the ancient common-law doctrine of marital unity. In
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous phrase "[at common law}
61 the
husband and the wife are one and that one the husband. . . ." The
husband owned the wife' s chattels and the husband's creditors were
entitled to reach them as a result. All that doctrine supposedly was swept
away by the married woman's property acts in the nineteenth century.
Discrimination against married women under the innocent spouse rules
62

seems indefensible as a matter of principle.

The Dutiful Wife
Another factor that is not explicitly acknowledged in the decisional
law is that the Tax. Court i s apparently more lenient to women wbo
fulfilled traditional wifely roles than toward educated and independent
divorced women. Housewives who were kept in the dark by their husbands as to business tend to fare well, especially rnothers with children
to support. Lack of education also helps. These are facrors that point to
lack of earning power and economic need (and arguably also bear upon
reason to know), and to that extent, they are legitimate concerns for
equitable relief that are authorized under the statute.
But there is also a tendency to reward women for their good character
or for the bad character of their husbands. Women who were dutiful to
•• Hoeper v . 'Talt Comm' n, 284 U.S. 206.219 (1931) .
" It appears probable that in such situations. where the husband is available, collection efforts
against him have proved futile. If the husband is insolvent, the wi.fe' s prope!1Y and income may
be just as essential to her as if she were single.
Somewhat surprisingly, the case reports 411roost never expljlin whether or how collection
attempts were made from the husband (no matter what the marital status of the petitioner). One
might think that in order to evaluate the fairness or equity of the caSe. some appreciation of the
reason why the IRS is pursuing the wife, rather than the husband , would be crucial. If the IRS
could just as easily collect from the husband, it would certainly appear arbitrar)' and inequitable to
pursue the wife instead. Similarly, if the husband was never even assessed and the IRS let the
starote of limitations run as to him , as se-ems to bave happened in Cohen v . Comm' r, 54 T .C.M.
944 (1987) , it seems unfair to make the wife foot the bill for the IRS's negligence (although this
seems to bave been the ultimate purpose of joint rerum liability in the first place-see note 4
Iupra). A ru.le requiring the IRS to ex.haust all remedies against the husband before arte:mptillg
collection from tbe wife would be very desirable. This is the rule for imposing transferee liability
underIn§ Bolcum
690 I. (94 T. C. No. !\). the husband was apparently very wealthy, but nothing is said
anywhere in the lengthy decision why collection was not made from him. His extensive assets may
ba:ve been put out of reach somehow . That is, incidentally , no reason to suspect collusion on the
wife's part. however. Just the reverse. If the coupl.e was plotting to make tl:ie husband judgmentproof to evade his wes whil.e leaving the wife with substantial assets to whii:h the government has
no right, reliance on § 60 13(e) would have been very foolish. They could easily bave filed
separately, and she would have avoided the issue of joint rerom liability altogether. Tbe insignificant
BIIIOUnt saved by filing jointly would have been oifling to these millionaires.

their husbands receive favorable treatment even if they were and remain
capable of supporting themselves and their families. Dependent women
who were overreached or victimized by their husbands also tend to receive
comfort. Independent and well-educated women seem to receive less
favorable treatment even where the size of the deficiency would obviously
cause them financial hardship. 63

Significant Benefit: During Marriage
Whether the wife received a significant benefit over and above ordinary support64 has two aspects; first, whether the wife enjoyed a lavish
life-style during marriage, and second, whether she received or retained
significant amounts of property purchased with untaxed income after
termination of the marriage. The first aspect overlaps with the more
important "reason to know" test discussed below, because if there were
unusual and lavish expenditures during marriage, that is generally held
to put the wife on notice that something is amiss. Where a high life-style
during marriage was constant and not unusual, however, that does not of
itself constitute a "significant benefit." Thus, in Sanders v. Comm 'r, 65
the widow of a successful physician who had omitted substantial amounts
of income was given relief despite the couple's purchase and improvement
of a new home, n~w cars, a condominium in the Bahamas, and gambling
trips to Las Vegas. The Sanders cowt said "one person's luxury can be
another's necessity, and the lavishness of an expense must be measured
from each family's relative level of ordinary support." 66
63
No claim is made that these preferences .are universal or that they can be proved statistically.
The decisional Jaw probably does not provide enouglt factS to prove the assertion one way or the
other. ln cases where the outcotjle is contraiy to the Tax Coun's own stated rules, however, there
is often sufficient information in the reported opinions to support the inferences made in the text .
No effort has been made to collect such cases generally.
~It was asserted in one case, however, that the wife received·a benefit because she was living
with her husband during the taxable year and the husband supported the family (with no further
facts provided) . See Spaulder v. Comm' r, 31 T.C.M. 723 (1972). The case has not been followed,
however, and is contradktoryto Reg. § 1.60 13-S(b): ''[N)ormal support is not a s:ignificant 'benefit'
for purposes of this determination ."
"'509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
66
SeeHindsv. Comm' r, 56T.C.M. 104 (1988) (kindergarden teacherdivorcedfromphysician
e~toneratedfrom over $200,000 tax liability; although she lived well during marriage, sbe received
no prtiperty purchased with untalted income). See also Dakil , 496 F.2nd at 431, where the court
said that !twas not convinced the petitiOner (again the widow of a wealthy physician) bad benefited,
despite a lwmrious life-style during marriage, because no evidence was presented as to what
ordinary support would be in her circumstances. This decision might seem peculiar inasmuch as
the burden of proof was upon her, not the government, to show no benefit was received. Also, the
Daki/ court made no findings as to her net worth and -its sources alth.o ugh at the time of trial she
evidently owned a home and three automobiles and belonged to a country club. Evidently, Ms.
Dakil made a very favorable impression on the coUrt (although not on the jury, which held against
her in an interrogatory on the question ofbenefit). The court pointed out that she worked pan: time
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On the other hand, perhaps inconsistendy , it was held in Estate of
Krock v. Comm 'r,61 that even if a couple is wealthy before, during , and
after the years at issue, the wife must produce evidence of the couple's
expenditures in order to succeed on this issue. In Bokum, the wife lost
on the same point, and the Tax Court majority opinion pointed out that
if the husband had paid the $400,000 plus that was owed in taxes, Ms.
Bokurn would probably ·llave had to make up the shortfall in68 their
$500,000 per year personal living- expenses out of be:r own funds. Two
judges concurring in the result in Bokum would have held against her on
this point alone in order to sidestep the issue of disagreement with the
Ninth Circuit regarding its interpretation of the "reason to know" test
under Section 6013(e)(l)(C).
In one recent case, the size of the beneftts and economic level
of the
69
couple' s life-style were not issues at all. In Barrett v. Comm 'r, the court
separately considered each of several dozen different expenditures derived
from untaxed income, ranging in size from $11,000 down to $19, in
order to determine which items bad benefited the couple jointly during
their marriage and which had benefited the guilty spouse alone. Relief
70
was granted only as to the latter items.

Benefit After Marriage
The cases involving property received or retained after dissolution of
marriage are inconsistent. Some cases indicate that any substantial property transferred to the wife that is derived from the husband's untaxed
in an outreach program helping senior citizens for S!.60 per hour. This fact seems to evidence
more abouL her good character than abput straitened fmancial circumstanCes.
' 93 T.C. No. 55 ( 1989). 1n Krock, the conn pointed out with dis<tPProval rhat when the
6
husband fled to the Bahamas in 1973 in order to avoid arrest and imprisonment for criminal tax
evasion, Ms. Krock a,ccompaoied him there and lived with him on a $4{)0,000 yacht until his death
in 1986. li seems doubtful, given the latitude of judicial discretion under § 6013(e) . that any
accounting or argument of law could have overcome the court's disapproval . Tlw Krock COWl did
not rrouble itself to consider any of the other elements for relief.
Ms. Bokum ha,d an iudepen<.ient income of SllO,QOO-SISO.OOO per yearftom family I.I'IISl
110
funds, and the couple lived on a\:lout SSOO,OOO per year, maintaining two residences in Florid;~ and
Montana with three gardeners, servants, and other staff, plus a large )'achL, for which a captain
and mate were employed.
•• 57 T .C .M. 45'8 (1989).
'lO The petitioner in Barr err was the husband, who was president and own~ (with his father
and an assQOiate) of two roofing companies in which his wife was office mana~ and viee president.
The wife (who was.nol an owner) embezzled funds from th-e companies , which she spent on herself,
her husband , and her lovers. As to some of the items , the husband was held to have reaso~ttoknow
on the ground that, as pres-ident, be was negligent in failing to oversee the corporate accounts. As
to others. the coWl found that he had no -reason to know 'oe.cause of the deviousness of her diversion
of funds. The items on which joint liability was found were cons_trucli ve dividends as to him and
embezilement income as to her.
The case carne to th.e IRS's attentiQll because, in the couple's divorce proceeding, the wife

income is enough to disqualify relief. 71 Also, the benefit may be substantial even if it is much smaller than the deficiency. 72 In Levin v. Comm 'r, 73
for example, a wife who received $11,000 representing one half of a tax
refund owed to her pursuant to her divorce settlement (she had to litigate
against her husband in order to obtain it) became liable for a $50,000
deficiency as a result, because the refund was itself due to a disallowed
tax-shelter d~duction. 74 To the contrary, however, in Estate of Brown v.

filed sworn papers asserting that the couple enjoyed unreported income from the companies. The
wife testified at the tax trial that Barrett knew all about the scheme and even that the idea had been
his father's, but she was not believed by the court. Also, the husband pointed out that she would
profit from this false testimony, becasue to the extent he was forced to pay, her own tax liability
would be extinguished. This is a depressingly recurrent theme in the case law.
71
See Quave, 49 T.C.M. at 445, where the divorced wife of a furniture dealer who had
concealed income lost on this issue for failure to offer any proof of the value of parcels of land she
received at divorce. The case is unusual in two respects-first, that petitioner won on the reason
to know test despite intimate involvement in the accounting side of the furniture business (the court
said that she should not be penalized for attempting to straighten out the husband's lack of any
bookkeeping), and second, that, despite making a favorable impression on Judge Korner, she lost
on the benefit issue alone. Many petitioners have failed the benefit test but nearly always after also
losing on the reason to know test, which ordinarily recieves much greater judicial attention.
More typical cases are Adams v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 300 (1973) (petitioner husband's net worth
was increased by his divorced settlement from $33,000 to $280,000 most of which was derived
from wife's fraudulent concealment of income from unreported sales commissions; petitioner also
lost on reason to know test because wife's refusal to show him tax returns should have put him on
notice); and LaMothe, 58 T.C.M. at 1358 (widow recieved over $650,000 directly or indirectly
from husband's estate; husband's deficiency from tax shelter was $18,000).
72
This seems always unfair. The wife's liability should never exceed the benefit received.
Cf. I.R.C. § 6901 (transferee liability), where the transferee is liable only to the extent of the
amount of the transfer. And under § 6901, the government has the burden of proof as to the
existence and amount of the transfer, but under the innocent spouse rules, the wife must prove that
she did not benefit. For a comparison of the two forms of liability, see Beck, note 5 supra at
400-408.
73
53 T.C.M. 6 (1987).
74
This benefit appears to have been the principal ground of decision although she was also
held to have reason to know because of the size of the $137,011 deduction. At the time of signing
the return, she was already divorced. Her divorce lawyer advised herto see the husband's accountant
about the return, and she signed it in the accountant's office after seeing only the claim of
overpayment for $23,274, without looking at the rest of the return. (Her ex-husband testified at
trial, however, that he discussed the investment with her, which may have damaged her claim of
innocence.) She knew that she was entitled to one half of the claimed overpayment pursuant to the
divorce agreement. This is one of a number of cases where it appears that professional advisers,
who had ample reason to know of the high risks involved, negligently failed to caution women
regarding their joint return liability.
.
There is a conflict of interest between husband and wife in such situations, and professionals
who fail to see it should be liable for malpractice. See Newberry v. Johnson, 294 Ark. 455, 743
S.W.2d 811 (1988) (husband's lawyer's statement to wife during divorce at signing of delinquent
returns for prior years that pursuant to divorce decree husband would pay all taxes, without
mentioning joint return liability, states cause of action for malpractice when wife who had earned
no income for delinquent years was later forced to pay taxes by the IRS, which was not bound by
divorce agreement; new trial granted on other grounds). Even where there is no separation expected
there should be exposure to malpractice liability for failure to warn in a delinquent tax situation,
because the wife's property is put at risk gratuitously.
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Comm'r ,75 a wife was given relief on the ground that the $500,000
deficiency was "utterly disparate" when compared to the (apparently not
inconsiderable) property that she had received pursuant to her divorce.
In other cases , women have been held liable where there was apparently
76
no benefit at all on the ground of "reason to know" alone, as in Shapiro .
In practice, many courts have not let seemingly sizable transfers
77
interfere with equitable relief in sympathetic cases. In Sanders, for
example, a widow was left with $1 50 ,000 of life insurance proceeds from
policies apparently purchased with unreported income, bpt the court said
the money would probably inure to the benefit of her small child78and
noted that, as a housewife, her employment prospects were poor. In
Estate of Cardulla v. Comm'r, 79 the Tax Court seems to have been
especially generous. There, the deceased husband, a retail salvage dealer,
failed to report 7 5-90 percent of his income for the four years in question ,
and during those same years, it appears that he purchased much of the
property bis wife inherited from him, which included bank accounts,
bonds, a California ranch, and an apartment building. The court was
impressed with her austere and hardworking life and found the benefit to
80
be no more than ordinary support.

Can a Wife Be Relieved of Her Own Tax Liability Through the
Innocent Spouse Rules?
In two-earner cases involving large deductions, it appears that the
wife may actually be better off if she wins innocent spouse status than if
55 T.C.M. 1249 (1988).
51 T.C.M. at 818. See also Estate of Jackson, 72 T.C. at 356.
77 509 F.2d at 162.
78 See Terzian v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979); cf. Dakil, 496 F.2d at 431.
"' 51 T.C.M. IS II (1986) .
l'l The wife worked seven .days a week in his retail store. ~ather surprisingly , she was found
to have no reason to know of !he omissi.ons , despi!e her deep involvement in his business. She
trUSted her husband to manage all their financial affairs and presllllled that be had prope.rly completed
75

76

talt rewms.
E.llale of Cardulla seelllS especially generous also because the IRS apparently had a good case
for transferee li,ability. The government occasionally as_sens both transferee liability and joint re.rum
liability at !he same time . See Mysse, 57 T.C . at 680: LaMothe, 58 T .C.M. at 1358. Perhaps the
case was not boought because the IRS was overconfident regarding .the innocent spouse i>sues. See
also Shapiro v. Comm 'r , 55 T.C.M . 1472 (1988) (divorced and remarried housewife relieved of
$96,490 deficiency from disallowed rax-sheltered deduction despite receiving an divorce from her
first husband property worth over $375,000, plus four-bedroom bouse , Lincoln Continental , and
olher valuable property). Conuast the (unrelated) petitioner's treatment in Shaplro. 51 T.C.M . at
818 (housewife and molher who received no p£Operty , alimony , or child suppon in divorce and
who was forced to go to work to suppon herself and her family held liable for $21.340 deficiency
from husband's unreported income; she was corporate officer and signed corporate documents
without reading them m accommodate husband (as she signed their tax retUrn), without any other
participation in management "Of business , because as a college gnidliate she could nm abdicate

their

she had filed separately. In fact, she may be freed of all tax on her
own income. In Price, the husband's tax-shelter deduction was so large
($90,000) that it nearly wiped out the couple's entire reported income
($100,000), including the wife's own $23,000 of income. As a result of
the Ninth Circuit's decision granting her innocent spouse status, she was
apparently exonerated from tax on her own income as well as that of her
husband. That seems absurd, but it apparently follows from the statute.
There is no authority for a judge to recompute her tax as if she had filed
separately, which is, of course, the only correct outcome. As a result, the
judge may be forced to choose between two obviously wrong outcomes.
The issue was not discussed in Price, nor bas it apparently been
squarely faced in any case81 or commentary. An argument can be made
that the wife received a significant benefit when she was relieved of the
tax on her own earnings. But that risks coming to the opposite wrong
conclusion that she is liable for the entire deficiency, including her
husband's taxes. 82
There is at least a possible argument that the grossly erroneous item
is not attributable solely to the husband on the ground that the understatement is caused by a combination of the deduction and the income which
responsibility to inquire into correctness of corporate documents and tax return that she signed).
This is one example among many where the Tax Court has counted a college education against
women.
.
" The Bokum court (94 T.C. No. 11 n.23) almost saw this apportionment issue, but not quite,
when it made the following remark:
Oddly, when Congress provided to the innocent spouse relief from the burdens of the joint
tax return, it did not remove from the "noninnocent" spouse the benefits of the joint return.
Thus, if spouse A were to provide all the income subject to tax, if spouse B had only taxexempt income (e.g., under sec. 103) and paid for substantial itemized deductible items
(contributions, home mortgage interest, etc.) out of that exempt income and ifB were relieved
of all tax liability under the innocent spouse provisions, then A apparently would be allowed
to retain the benefits of deducting B' s expenditures against A's income as well as the benefits
of joint tax return rates (nither than the rates applicable to married people filing separately).
There is no abuse .as to the itemized deductions in the Tax Court's example. Itemized
deductions can be easily shifted from one spouse to the other under current rules by simply having
B make A a gift of the funds with which to pay the expenses-this has nothing to do with joint
returns, and in the above example, the deductions Cllll be shifted even if the spouses file separately.
82
The govenune.nt made this argument in its brief on appeal in Price (887 F. 2d at959), but
the opinion does not mention the issue. A fmding was made in the unreported trial opinion in Price
that there was no benefit to the wife (without reference to the issue of the tax on her own earnings),
and the finding was not considered on appeal.
The benefit issue was discussed in Kern v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. 659 (1985), where the wife
was denied relief for her ex-husband's erroneous investment tax credit, from which she was held
to have some benefit because it offset her own taxes as well as his, but there was no mention of
apportionment (she failed to present evidence as to other benefits).
If the wife is exempted from tax on her own income, it should not mean that she automatically
loses under the benefit test.. If the husband kept the entire refum,l, she may not have benefited.
Also, if the husband's tax.es were much gteater !han the wife's, the "utterly disparate" doctrine of
Estate of Brown (55 T.C.M. at 1249) might. be applicable.
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is thereby offset. To the extent that the income offset is the wife's, the
item would be attributable in part to her and would not be eligible for
relief under Section 6013(e)(l)(B). That is logical and would yield the
right result, but the statute does not lend itself easily, if at all, to this
interpretation. 83
It would appear that this bizarre and wholly unintended consequence
84
of the rules can only be corrected by amendment of the statute .

Innocence
The most difficult test for the wife is that she must prove that, at the
time of signing the return, she did not know , and had no reason to know,
that there was an understatement. At the statutory level, this innocence
test, which is at the heart of the relief rules, is illogical and inappropriate
as a basis for relief. Ordinarily, a reason to know (or due diligence) test
is applied in the context of assessing whether a person who is in a position
to prevent foreseeable harm to others has breached a duty of care . In this
tax context, there is no harm caused by the wife's lack of due diligence
except to herself. The duty of care is spurious and arises from the relief
rules themselves, rather than from any preexisting and independently
justifiaole duty.
If she does not sign the return, the government is not helped in any
way because the husband can simply file his own_ erroneous re-turn. The
IRS cannot plausibly claim that it relies on the wife 's signature to cenify
the accuracy of the husband' s income , as if she were an auditor.lt cannot
help knowing what everyone else knows - that women do not feel that
they have any such duty and do not act as if they did. Moreover , the
government does nothing to make women aware of this duty pr to warn
them of their liability.
83 Under I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(B), relief can only be granted for "a substantial understatement
of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse'" (i .e., the husband).
Under I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) a "grossly erroneous item'' with respect to any spouse is:
(A) any item of gross income attributable to such spouse which is omitted from gross

income, and

(B) any claim of a deduction, credit, or basis by such spouse in an amount for which
there is no basis in fact or law.
There seems to be no obvious way to interpret a grossly erroneous deduction as be)ng
attributable to the husband alone only to the e;<:tent that it offsets the husband's income. It might
be argued that to the extent the deduction offsets the wife's income, she is the spouse who is
making the '"claim," but this seems strained .
84 This could be done by defining " attributable'" under§ 60 13(e)(l)(B) in some appropriate
way. The problem would disappear if joint return liability were repealed altogether and the wife
were liable only for the amount of j oint tax which is proportional to her own net income.
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Even if a wife is aware of this duty the penalty for it is unfair. If a
professional return preparer or an IRS agent fails to use due diligence,
he does not become liable for the tax deficiency that he could reasonably
have been expected to discover on someone else's return. And yet, such
persons have both tax expertise and awareness of their professional duties,
upon which the- IRS does reasonably rely.
In short, it makes no real difference to the government's interests
whether the wife is innocent or whether she makes an effort at due
diligence when she is put on notice. For that reason, there is no underlying
purpose or principle to guide the Tax Court when it tries to weigh the
factors it uses to determine degrees of innocence.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the various legal tests
have in large part degenerated into a global subjective one of whether the
woman and her plight can move the judge to sympathy.
Whether the wife had reason to know is the principal inquiry. 85 The
test has been stated to be whether a reasonably prudent person in
the wife's situation would have reason to be put on notice. 86 Among the
factors that have been held relevant are (1) whether the husband made
lavish or unu~ual expenditures, 87 (2) the extent of the wife's participation
in the husband's business and in family budgeting, 88 (3) the wife's knowledge or awareness of the husband's business or illegal activity, (4)
85
Actual knowledge of the understatement, in the sense that the wife knew her husband was
cheating on his taxes, is almost never an issue. But actual knowledge that the husband deliberately
cheated on his taxes seems to have been excused in Hayes, 57 T.C.M. at 869, discussed at p. 35
infra.
86
Sanders, 509.F.2d at 170. The burden of proof is on the wife to prove a negative proposition-her own lack of knowledge or reason to know-and that burden has often seemed unfairly
difficult. It would be fairer to reverse the burden of proof and place it on the government. The
government has the burden of proof as to willfulness or intent in imposing the civil fraud penalty,
which is in some respects analogous.
87
In Estaie of Jai:k.son (72 T .C. at 356), the widow of a narcotics dealer lost on this ground
alone, because she was left with little property after his death. She seemed a good candidate for
sympathy because she was a housewife and mother, with a sixth-grade education, and because her
husband had mistreated her and set up several girlfriends in different locations. The court recognized
that the result was harsh but said the .reason to know test was separate from the benefit test, and
both must be met. She said she thought ·that her husband was in the cement business, but perhaps
the judge suspected she knew of his narcotics trade.
88
ln Shea (780 F.2d at 561), a widow was denied relief whose husband had skimmed money
from his business using her personal checking account to divert the funds. She had tried to make
him stop, and apparently she was unaware of most of the unauthorized use, but she was on -notice.
Her husband read the .statements when they arrived. Here, a college education may have hurt ,her
as well. She was found careless. in ignoring her "ducy as bank CU5tomer" to review her own bank
statements under Section 1304.29 of the Ohio Revised Code. (This duty is for the bank's benefit
to protect it from stale claims of unauthorized use where the customer could have discovered the
forgeries within one year.) The fact that she had no income of her own makes it appear that the
account may actually have been the husband's although it was in her name.
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whether the husband was forthright or uncooperative in sharing financial
information with her, and (5) the wife's own level of education and state
of mind.
Most of these factors are of dubious relevance. Involvement in the
husband's busine-ss89 or in family budgeting implies nothing as to her
knowledge of the tax return unless she has actually participated in prepar91
90
ing the return . Independent business experience and higher education
imply nothing as to knowledge of taX matters in general or of the busband's taXes in _particular. The wife's employment should perhaps cut the
other way on the ground that it reduces the time that she has to devote to
family matters. A poorly educated housewife without business e>--perience
whose entire attention is devoted to husband and family may have a much
better grasp of her husband's financial and tax concerns than a wife who
has an independent life outside the home. Indeed, the husband's financial
concerns are necessarily more important to the wife who is completely
dependent. In short, many of the Tax Court's rules, at least as stated
in the abstract, seem to be biased against educated, successful, and
independent women.
Duty to Read Return
Some cases have held that the wife has a duty to read the tax return
and that, if she exercised it, she would have been put on notice of
suspiciously low reported income or extraordinarily high deductions or
umeported transactions. 92 Other decisions have ignored this duty and
89 If the business is legitimate. If she is aware of illegal activities, it is not implausible for her
to infer that her husband may be breaking the tax law as well .
90 Most women who work are employees, and their knowledge of tax matters is ordinarily
limited to the rudiments necessary for their own taXes, which may' not go beyond fumishing a
W-2 to their husbands or to a tax preparer. In addition, people can be expected to know the
particular rutes affecting their own work. Thus, a waitress should be elql<:Cted to know of the
reporting requirements for tips under § 6053 . But it would be surprising for anyone outside the
resraurant business to know of that section, however successful she may be in her own business.
' ' Colleges and graduate schools do not teach taX except in business and law courses. (Occasionally this fact is recognized in the decisional law. See the cases discussed i n note 112 infra.)
Even these courses are at a rather general level. Most of the tax problems in the reported innocent
spouse decisions either re~uire no education at all to understand (s uch as failing to report physicians'
fues) or are so arcane that no education short of a CPA or graduate law degree in taX could prepare
one to understand (such as the S corporation issues in Bokllm (94- T .C . No. ll), the§ 357 (c) issues
in McCoy (57 T .C. at 732) and Lessinger v. Comm'r (85 'f.C. 824 (1985)) or the technical issues

of tax shelters generally) .
It may also be doubted whether higher education develops one's common sense or the ability
to detellt dishonesty in others.
91 See , e.g., Cohen , 54 T .C.M. at 944 (divorced sch.o olteacher and college graduate could
not do "ostrich imitation" by not reading return; liability imposed for tax-shelter deduction even
though husband was CPA taX partner at Peat Marwick, and stipulated that be also did not know
shelter was fraudulent) ; cf. Levin, 53 T.C.M. at 6.
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treated her failure to read the return as additional evidence that she had
no reason to know of the offending item.93 Whether she looked or whether
her husband mentioned the shelter to her is often contested by the husband.94 Other decisions imply that there is such a duty but that failure to
review does not defeat relief in cases where the return is complex so that,
if she had looked, she would not have spotted the errors. 95
Still other decisions have held that it is reasonable to expect housewives without business experience or higher education to leave tax matters
to their husbands. 96 This is refreshingly realistic, but the doctrine should
be extended to all women who reasonably entrust tax matters to their
husbands, whether or not they are highly educated or have business
experience. Unless there is some reason for mistrust, it is pointless for
preparation.
both spouses to suffer the drudgery of

tax

Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse

The doctrine that actual knowledge. of the transaction constitutes
reason to know, even if the wife knows nothing of the transaction's tax
consequences, seems to have its origin in McCoy. 97 The doctrine is
93
See, e.g., Guth v. Comm'r, 897 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1990); Belk, 93 T.C. at 434; Bouskos,
54 T.C.M . at 1117; McRae, 55 T.C.M. at 1560.
"' Often, this is a situation where th.ere are no wimesses except the hus band, and so there is
opportunity for setf-serving testimony if not perjury. The most favorable position for the wife to
take is that she did look: at the rctum, questioned her husband about it, and received satisfactory
assurances. as in Price. If there is evidence to support a scenario that she was excluded from the
family finances, a story that he stonewalled her and refused to show her the return may also do,
especially if she does not have a college degree.
If the ex-husband testifies, however, he may have an incentive to say she knew all about the
shelter and asked nothing (worst case) or that she never bothered to look at the return "at all. His
i.m;entive may be arti.mo&ity or a desire to baveJlls own liability extinguished or both. The case
reports refer to a fair amount of dreary testimony·of this kind, which should probably be discounted
by the courts .
95
See, e.g., Padgett v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. 332 (1987).
96
DeMartino, 51 T.C.M. at 1278 (a. divorcee and a still-married wife relieved of liability for
huge de.ficiencies from tax motivated ·commodity straddles) :

The business affairs of Eliz.abeth and Elaine were conducted entirely by their husband~ .
Elizabeth and Elaine are high school gradutes who spent thiili time occopied as housewives
during the year in issue. The exrem _o f each spouse's participating in financial matters was to
pay the household bills. For this purpose, e~mh of these women bad her own cbeclcing account
lnto which their husbands would periodically deposit money. Each spouse-presumed, as would
women of similar experience and temperament, that their husbands would properly complete
/heir Federal income tax relurns. [Emphasis added.]
97
57 T .C . at732. McCoy involved the application of§ 357(c) to inco.rporation of a partnership.
Gain was trigger:ed because the partnership's liabilities transferred exceeded its basis in assetS
transferred. The transaction itself was legitimate business, and the wife was not involved in any
way. She did not read the return, which was prepared by a CPA, and she had no other reason to
know of the unreported gain except that she knew of the incorporation transaction . Her husband
did not understand the tax conseq_oences either. The "ignorance of the law is no excuse'' doctrine
was proffered withoul analysis, as if it were self-evident.
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difficult to square with the statute, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit pointed out in Sanders, 98 because the statute requires the wife to
prove no reason to know of the ·<understatement" (rather than of the
"grossly erroneous item") and at least arguably that must imply no reason
to know of the item's tax consequences . But despite that promising
beginning, the Sanders court .immediately veered off course with a gratuitous99 but much-repeated statement that ignorance of the law should be
no excuse in these situations, for the same reasons as in the criminal
law. An examination of those reasons leads to precisely the opposite
conclusion. 100
This dubious proposition was not analyzed further in Sanders or in
any other decision. Under the innocent spouse rules, reasonable ignorance
of the law should be just as good an excuse as reasonable ignorance of
the facts. The statutory test is, after all, whether the wife knew or should
have known of the understatement. The statute, therefore, requires an

98 509 F.2d at 162.
'Ill The is~ue in Sanders involved unreported physician's fees. as 10 which there could be no
question or doubt as to taxabitity . Thus, the only decision to analyze the "ignorance of the law is
no excuse" doctrine did so as dictum, and the first case to announce the doctrine '(McCoy) did so
as an ipse dixit . 'The doctrine has a pparently never been questioned, unless perhaps implicitly by
the Second Circuit in Altman v. Comm'r, 475 F .2d 876 (1973) (wife liable for taX on unreported
income beeause she knew husband's receipts were not gifts; McCoy not cited}.
'
Sanders. 509 F .2d at 169 n.l4. The Fifth Circuit said that "the practical problems that
00
have always prevented acceptance of an ignorance of the law defense in the criminal law area. see
W. LaFave & A. Seen, Handbook on Criminal Law. ~ 47, at 363--64 (1972), arguably apply just

as forcefully
here."
A rev1ew
of the pages cited in the Handbook on Criminal LAw discloses no such practical
problems even remotely applicable to civil taX liability under§ 6013(d) , however. For example,
although the criminal law might become more uncertain if it depended upon the knowledge and
subjective pereeptions of the accused, the taX law would not become uncertain if it depended on
the wife· s knowledge in innocent spouse cases because she is not the taXpayer. The tax law would
remain certain and objective as to the nusband and other taxpayers, whatever their knowledge may
be. (One need have no fear that innocent spouse law w!ll become .subjective and uncertain; it
already
)
Theis,pages
refened to in Sanders reveal considerable doubt among the commenrators as to the.
sound= of the max.im even in the criminal area. For example, Justice Holmes, questioned
whether "a man's knowledge of the Jaw is any harder to investigate than many questions which
are gone into. " O.W . Holmes. The Common l..ml• 48 (188 1). ln McCoy (ali in Bokwn), there was
no doubt that the wife was ignorant of the Jaw; it would be extraordinary if she did know anything
of§ 357(c).
LaFave and Scott themselves state:
[T]he vast network of regulatory offenses which make up a large pan of today's crimina11aw
does not stem from the mores of the community, and so "moral education no longer serves
us a guide to what is prohibited." [Cite omitted. ) Under these circumstances. where one's
moral attirodes may not be ~;elied upon to avoid the forbidden conduct, it may seem particularly
severe for the lew never to recognize ignorance or mista.Ke of the criminal law as a defense.
W. LaFave & A. Scott, id. at 364. This observation applies a fortiori to civil offenses and still
more to acts and omissions that are not properly speaking offenses al all.

inquiry into the wife's state of mind, and an essential element of that state
of mind is that a tax is (or may reasonably expected to be) due. 101 The
ignorance is no excuse doctrine sll:nply reads this requirement out of the
statute altogether, with absurd results. It is nonsense to pretend the wife
can be put on notice where she bas no reason to suspect the applicability
of arcane technicalities in the tax law, the transaction itself is leiitimate,
and the matter is properly in the bands of tax. experts.
The McCoy decision was followed in Lessinger102 on nearly identical
facts involving incorporation of a deficit partnership, and the court added
that " no evidence was introduced that she was prevented from ascertaining
the facts about the joint return she was signing . . . she had no interest
in the details.'' On the other ·band, the court gave rio reason why she
should have had any interest in the details or should have been on notice
to inquire, and none comes to mind. 103 The transaction was structured by
a CPA, and, as in "McCoy, the husband apparently did not know the tax
consequences either. The McCoy and Lessinger decisions seem hopelessly wrong because these women had absolutely no reason to seek a
second professional tax opinion. If the Tax Court wanted to impose
liability simply because they were still married, 104 which appears probable, 105 it would have been better to do so with more candor via the equity
101
Inquiry into the taxpayer' s state of mind is not foreign to the tax law. and it is even true
that ignorance of the law is excusable in some situations. Imposition of the fraud penalty, both
civil and criminal, requires proof of the taxpayer's willful intent to evade taxes . See H . Balter,
Tax Fraud tuui Evasion~ 2.01 [4](19&3). Problems of proof have nol been insurmountable in that
area. Nor does the fact that the taxpayer's subjective state of mind is determinative render the
$Ubstantive tax law uneef\ain ana subjem:ive. The tax itself is due whatever tbe taxpayer's state of
mind may be; only the additional fraud penalty depends on an element of subjectivity.
If the Fifth Circuit had read one page further in the Handbook 011 Criminal Law, it would
have found a discussion there of Hargrove v. United States, 67 F.2d 820 (Sib C ir. 1933) (defendant
who was unaware of his duty to pay income taxes held innocent under statute making it an offense
knowingly to attempt to evade taXes). LaFave & Scott cite Hargrove ..yiih approval: '"Ignorance of
the law, after all , is (emphasis in original] an excuse when it negatives a required mental element
of the crime .. .. " W . LaFave & A . Scott, note 100 supra, a t365.
101
85 T .C. at &24. IroruC!illy, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the
Tax Court did not understand the taX consequences either and reversed on the ground that the
husband'spersonal note t.o the corporation succ~y prevented any taxable gain to the Lessingers.
thus mooring the innocent spouse question. The Second Circuit's opinion lias been criticiZ!!d
however. See Megaard, & Megaard, "Can Shareholder's Note Avoid Gain on Tr.msfer of Excess
Liabilities?'' 7l J. Tax 'n 244 (1989); Bogdanski. "Shareholder Debt, Corporate Debt: Lessons
From L.eaviu and Lessinger," 16 J. Corp. Tax 'n 34& (1 990) .
' 0 ~ Unless the wife is on notice to inquire and actually does consult an expert, the ar.sumption
that she will know and understand complex. and t.eclm.ical tax law is suueal. As newspaper surveys
demonstrate e very year around tiiX time, even professional preparers and IRS infonnarion personnel
do not know the law.
.
""' The Lessingers, like the McCoys, were still married and Jiving together at the time of trial.
For a similarly technical and innocent omission of income by a still-married couple with the same
outcome, see Smith v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 651 (197&) .
IllS There are several omission cases in which a divorced or widowed woman has won despite
aatual knowledge of the transaction , and at least one where $he had actual knowledge of the tax
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test. 106 The ignorance-is-no-excuse doctrine seems to have been created
solely for the ulterior purpose of denying relief to Ms. McCoy , who
otherwise qualified. It is not surprising that the Tax Court has found this
pseudodoctrine an embarrassing impediment in later cases where it wanted to grant relief to divorced women.
If the unreported income is in cash, the presumption of knowledge of
the tax consequences is more reasonable. A claim of ignorance that wages
are taxable would be unthinkable, and omissions of this kind have not
107
been excused for failure to review the return. A claim by the wife that
108
she did not know embezzled money is taxable receives short shrift,
and, in such cases, there is the additional fact that the wife bas actual
knowledge that the husband has been dishonest in financial matters.

Actual Knowledge of Deductions: Price
The "actual knowledge" (or "ignorance is no excuse") doctrine was
originally no more than a subterfuge to reach the desired result in McCoy.
But because the doctrine was later taken at face value (especially by the
Fifth Circuit in Sanders), it led to the confused disagreement in Bokum
and Price over its applicability to deduction cases. The doctrine is problematic in the area of deductions because deductions are necessarily on
the return. If the wife read the return and the actual knowledge doctrine
consequences as well . See Estate of Vella v. Comm·r, 43 T.C.M . 528 (1982); Hayes, 57 T.C.M.
869 (1989); Ratana v. Comm' r, 662 F .2d 220 (\981). discussed at pp. 35-37 infra .
On its face, the benefit teSt would have been difficult to apply because the taxpayers
106
received no economic gain in the form of cash or other propcrry. Section 357(c) is at bottom an
accounting rule designed to prevent a negative basis for stock received in a tax-free exchange; the
amount of negative basis is written up to zero, and that amount is ueated as taxable gain.
On the other hand, the McCoy court might have said (as the Bolamt coun did) that the wife
benefited because if the husband bad paid the taX, the wife might have had to make up the resulting
shortfall in household funds out of her own property. Even if this reasoning is somewhat lame, 1t
would have been better than inventing.an absurd new doctrine out of whole cloth. The new doctrine
was later taken at face value and not recognized as the subterfu.g e that it was. Thus does the law
confu
sion . v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. 665 (1986). Contra, Hayes, 57 T.C. at 869, discussed
become' See
Alberts
10
at p. 35 Anderson
irifra.
v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M . 508 (1975). See Trimmer , 45 T .C.M. at 960. where the
101
innocent husband also complained that he bad no knowledge of joint and several liability, or
he would have ftled separately instead. Of course he lost, but his argument is not altogether
unreaJionable.
If th.e government actually wanted wives to take protective action when they are reasonably
alerted to possible taX irregularities, it would take some action !o make the public aware of the
unpleasant consequences of not doing sa. It could il.lleast put a prominent warning near the signature
line of the Form 1040. and to protect those who do not sign personally, it could insist that all
preparers inform their clients of joint return liE.bility.
One suspects that the IRS prefers public ignorance in order to have two sources of collection,
rather than one.

applied, she would be liable automatically for every item on the return
because she bas actual knowledge of its existence. Literal superimposition
of the actual knowledge doctrine in deduction (or basis) cases would
frustrate Congress's intention to liberalize the relief rul~s when it made
such cases eligible for relief in 1984. The Ninth Circuit made this argument in Price when it reversed the Tax Court and insisted that there must
be something more than bare knowledge of the item's existence in order
to impose liability. According to the Ninth Circuit, there must be some
additional factor to put the wife on notice of a possible understatement. 109
In Price, the court made much of the fact that the wife asked her
husband about the huge tax-shelter deduction that "seemed a bit much"
but was reassured by him that a CPA had prepared the return, thus
satisfying her duty to inquire. In the Ninth Circuit's view, her situation
was different from Levin, where the wife did not inquire. 110 But it is also
revealed that Price was an investment broker and sold shares in the phony
venture to clients. If Ms. Price had been genuinely concerned about the
legitimacy of the deduction, her husband was hardly the person to ask.
Moreover, if knowledge that a CPA prepared the return is sufficient
diligence, the Price case is indistinguishable from Levin or Cohen. 111
There is no point in asking what one already knows.
The Ninth Circuit itself implicitly recognized this point, thus completely undercutting its argument that the inquiry in Price distinguishes
it from Levin when it said that the facts in Hinds v. Comm 'r 112 were
strikingly similar and quoted from that decision:
ul• Price, 887 P.2d at 963-964 n.9. The Price coun thought this was ultlrnately the same test
as for omissions because actual knowledge of an omission is almost necessarily the same thing as
knowledge that the relllm does nat report all income. In order tQ know that a deduction resultS in
an. understatement, one must know at least something more than that it exis!S. That is lliiJIS.Sltilable
as lang as ~e omission. is cash. But the case in chief for r.he actual knowledge test as applied to
omissions is McCoy (57 T .C. at 732), where there was no reason to suspect an understatement.
10
' Note that this tenuous djstinction, even if valid, cannot be established without reliance on
testimony that is suspect for the reasons given above.
111
In Levin (53 T .C. M. at 6), the husband teStified that be told his wife about the investment
and that it was to provide for the couple's retirement in same undisclosed fashion. In Cohen (54
T .C.M. at 944), the busbJUJd testified that be went through the return point by point with his
wife- but !t was stipula~ that he (himself a CPA UlX parmer at Peat Marwick) did nor know the
shelter was phony. Levin was a physician, and there is no reason to think he would have bought
the shelt.e r if he actually knew it was phony (it is fair to suppose that shelter salesmen told clien!S
just the opposite). Thus, Ms. Price would appear ro have had the weakesl case of the three, yet
·
she won .
m 56 T.C .M . at 104. In Hinds, the wife W)IS divorced from a physician who had cl;rimed
huge tax-shelter cleducrions. She was given relief even though she was a college graduate. The
coun pointed out that she was a piano major and had not studied ousiness or accounting. But in
Shapiro, 51 T .C.M . at 818, the same judge, Judge Kamer, held against the wife wba had studied
French. (We are .not told what the schoolteacher wife studied in Coften, who also last far her
"ostrich imitation" but the facts do indicate that she bad no business background.) See also Estate
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[The culpable spouse) exerted near tot.al control over the couple's financial
affairs. The ex1ent of petitioner's participation in their financial affairs was
to accept money from him to use to pay household expenses and to purchase
the family's food and clothing. She relied on her husband to ensure that
their Federal income tax returns were properly completed. She undoubtedly
presumed thar the returns were proper as they had been prepared by certified
public accountants. [Emphasis added.]

The winning cases are completely indistinguishable from the losing
ones, at least on the only purported rationale of reasonable inquiry.
Bokum
In Bokum, the wife knew that the husband's S corporation had sold
a large ranch and made inquiries as to its tax treatment on the couple's
return, which was prepared by an accountant. The principal issue was
whether the wife had reason to know of an understatement of nearly
$1 million due to a $2,089,057 improper deduction of the hUsband's basis
from the S corporation dividend . It was stipulated that neither husband
nor wife knew of the error. The majority on the Tax Court held that the
McCoy doctrine of actual knowledge applied and so held against the wife
on the ground that she knew of the transaction itself- viz., the sale of
the ranch . The majority said mat the doctrine applied in deduction cases
in just the same way as in omissions cases and that actual knowledge of
the circumstances that give rise to the tax error is the test, ramer than
awareness of the tax consequences. Purcell was also cited for the same

proposition. 113
of Killian. 5.3 T .C .M. at 1438. where Judge Korner again allowed a college grnduate (in literature),

who had studied no business and relied on her husband. relief from tax shelter deductions . She
was a widow with two children and a junior high school reading teacher.
Judge Korner' s ccmpletely different ani tude toww:d college arts graduates in Hinds and Esrare
of Killian on the one hand , and Shapiro. nn the other , may be partly explained by some more facts .
As to Ms. Shapiro, he found her to be ·'an intelligent , [a] mature , and [an] educated woman" who
by signing docments she had not read " assumed a responsibility she could not abdicate.'' Ms.
Hinds . on the other band , could not balance a checking account and , until ber marriage at age 26.
had lived with her family and let her father manage all her ftnances and prepare her tax returnS.
She was apparently immature, and always ne~ed ro depend on ·a man .
Ms. Killian ·'trusted Jerry completely to manage their financial affaiJ:S in a WffY that would
benefit their family . He bandied all their banking in 1981. The only finan.cial maner Jerry discussed
with petitioner was the amount of money sbe was allowed to run the household."
The Ninth Circuit also cited Esrare of Killiro• app,roving)y as suppon because the widow
testified that she had nociced the large refund . asked her husband about it, and signed the return
only after he told her it was "due to long-term investments that their certified public accoumant
had recommended.'' (This testimony hardly squares with the finding in the preceding paragraph ,
bu1, of course. there was nobody to contradict it.) And the return was prep_ared by a CPA in whom
she trusted.
826 F.2d at 470. l n Purcell, the issue referred to was the noncompete agreement discussed
113
above. which caused recharacterization of capital gain into ordinary income. The Sixth Circuit

The majority in Bokum went on to argue that its position was, in fact,
the same as that of the Ninth Circuit in Price. 114 There were other
circumstances in Bokum that went beyond mere knowledge of the existence of the sale and that should have put Ms. Bokum on notice. The
Bokum majority then suggested that there was something suspicious about
the huge deduction of basis and that if Ms. Bokum had given even "a
cursory glance," the red flag would have been obvious from its size:
The distribution, and the tax treatment of the distribution, were not hidden
in the recesses of the tax return; one did not have to be a tax expert to see
that a large distribution from Quinta was being reported on the tax return.
Nor did one have to be a tax expert to see that $2,089,057 was being
subtracted . . ..
affirmed the Tax Coun's decision that the wife (a widow, this time) had actual knowledge of the
existence of the agreement because she signed the contract of sale of the company, of which she
was a shareholder, and initialed the noncompete clause. The Sixth Circuit gave reasons for her to
know that seem inconsequential, such as that she was intermittently involved to a very minor extent
in clerical work for the family busine·ss, and that she was a shareholder, and (nonmanaging) officer
and director. A CPA prepared the return, she did not look at it, and no reason whatsoever was
given why she should have questioned anything on it if she had looked . It is difficult to distinguish
McCoy (57 T.C. at 732), and it seems wrong for the same reasons as McCoy.
In Purcell, the Sixth Circuit does not mention the fact to be found in the Tax Coun's decision
that the wife was also bound by the noncompete agreemenL If so , there was a much better argument
for holding her liable because at least some of the in com~ allocable to the noncompete agreement
arguably was her own.
As noted above, the Bokum court (94 T.C . No . I I) did not discuss the fact that its decision
contradicted Purcell as to whether recharacterization was an omission or a deduction . Perhaps the
reason was that if it ~eel with Purcell and held that the ordinary portion of the dh'idend (resulting
from § 1245 income) were an income item, it could not be disallov;ed on the ground that it was
not grossly erroneous. And as an income item, it was hllfPly a red flag on the return. On the other
hand. if it said Purcell was wrong, Purcell could no longer be cited as additional authority for the
McCoy doctrine.
114
The majority in Bokum thought the Ninth Circuit's result was contrary to the correct
standard but that the Price result was inconsistent with the Price court's own statement of the law
that know ledge of
virtually all of the facts pertaining to the transaction . . . is considered as a matter of
law [emphasis added in Bokum court's quotation of Price] to have reason to know of the
understatement
·
and that if there was a disagreement as to the statecj standard it was only one of the amount the
wife must know in addition to bare existence of the transaction.
Three Tax Coun judges in the first of Bokum 's concw:ring opinions thought that the same
standard was be.i ng consistently applied by all the circuits as well as by the T.ax Court- viz ., that
knowledge of the circwnsrances (emphasis in original opinion) giving rise ro the underst:atement
is critical, rather than. bare knowledge of the existence of the transaction, without more, and that
there was enough knowledge of the circliJllSt:ances to justify liab.ifuy . Judge Pl!U (with Jndge
Hamblen) would have avoided an w•necusary (emphasis in original opinion) conflict with the
Ninth Circuit by holding against Ms. Bok'lliii on the benefit test and wisely ducked the question_ of
law .
·
The disscn.ters thought the strong version of the rule was wrong and that it b.ad been applied
in Hokum giving the wrong result. They do not mention that this position necessarily entails
repudiating McCoy .
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This comment overlooks the fact that if Ms. Bokum had reviewed the
return, she would have seen that an overall gain. of$516 ,215 was reported
from the transaction , which hardly seems fishy by itself. Moreover, not
the slightest reason was given why Ms. Bokum should have looked at
the return at all since it was stipulated that she knew nothing about taxes
and the return was prepared by a CPA. 115 The decision seems wrong for
11 6
the same reasons as McCoy and Lessinger.
111
The Bokum majority then cited Quinn v. Comm'r and Stevens v.
.Comm'r11 8 in an attempt to demonstrate that the Courts of Appeals for
the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits were in agreement with its view
and that these decisions are in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's reversal
of the Tax Court in Price. The facts ln Quinn and Stevens do not seem
to support this conclusion, however. and it is noteworthy that the government saw no conflict to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court when Price
was handed down.
In Stevens, relief from deficiencies for tax-shelter losses was denied
to a divorced woman who had been married to a tax-shelter promoter
who achieved sudden wealth . The couple's scale of living rose from frugal
(if not precarious) to opulent within a few years. The wife participated
somewhat in the business but was also regularly present at social events
where tax-shelter syndicators discussed the pros and cons of shelters in
her presence, and she also attended shelter seminars and other business
discussions. Ms. Stevens tried to present herself as an ignorant housewife
who was kept in the dark by her husband. These facts seem far removed
from Bokum where the husband was apparently a legitimate businesssman
and the sale of property was perfectly licit. Also, the Bokums had always
been wealthy, and their return showed a large tax due, rather than losses.
The Quirm decision is based on facts even farther removed from the
situation in Bola.un. In Quinn, the deficiency was for an omission, but it
is a _post-1984 decision that repeats the McCoy doctrine that actual knowledge of the transaction is sufficient to prevent relief. There the similarity
to Bokum ends. The Quinn court correctly said the still-married wife had
115 As additional reasons for Ms . Bo"kum to be .suspicious , the majority says the prcparer did
not sign the rerum (couldn' t she have thought that be would sign later?) and !hat be bad made "the
obvious error" of failing to sublrllct th~ zero bracket amount on the very next page. Judge Swifts'
concurring opinion adds another circumstance (apparently as giving dse to another reason for
suspicion , and as proof of benefit) - that Ms. Bokum nad lived on the ranch every summer!
116 A more plausible reason for suspicion may lay elsewhere. It seems improbable that Ms.
Bokum could have lived with her husband for fony-ninc yeats without knowing something about
his attitude toward income UlXcS, and Mr. Bok-um seems to have been a very taJ:-averse person .
111 524 F .2d 617 (7th Cir. l975).
118 872 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1989).

every reason to know of her husband's fraud; in fact, he was indicted for
fraud for this very transaction by a federal grand jury before the tax year
was over. Moreover, Ms. Quinn directly and knowingly participated in
and profited from the fraud.

Conflict Between the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit?
The Bokum court stood by its hard line interpretation of the McCoy
doctrine but denied that its position yielded unreasonably severe outcomes
in deduction cases. In response to the Ninth Circuit's argument in Price
that the Tax Court's position "would for the most part wipe out innocent
spouse protection" in deduction cases, the majority opinion in Bokum
cited four of its own recent cases in which it had granted relief. In none
of these cases did the wife even look at the return, however, and in three
cases, the wife seems to have had no independent reason to know of the
offending item. 119 The fourth case, Guth, 120 seems to contradict the Tax
Court's position flatly. In Guth, the Ninth Circuit found itself in agreement with the Tax Court but only because both courts contradicted their
own versions of the McCoy doctrine sub silentio.
·
Guth involved phony charitable contributions. Ms. Guth was treasurer
of her husband's chapter of the Universal Life Church (ULC), signed its
checks, and had actual knowledge of the underlying transfers of funds
back and forth between his personal account and the church. The Tax
Court absolved Ms. Guth from liability and mentioned McCoy but distinguished it on the ground that her husband deceived her as to the true
purpose of the church, without discussion of the "actual knowledge"
issue. Ms. Guth was divorced and worked as a nurse's aide. She appeared
dutiful and trusting, relied on her husband in all financial matters, and
119
The ignorance of !he law question was apparently not explicitly raised in any of these
cases, however. In Bell (56 T.C.M. at 1467),-a major item was the disallowance of a $90,648
interest deduction !hat was not paid, but ro.lled in to principal. The Bell coun said that there was
nothing on the return to indicate it was not paid in cash, and although the wife did not read the
return , even a tD.1: expert-would have not .have discovered the error. Bw the ilem was large enough
to sustain a negligence penalty, and it appears that inquiry of the lender would have revealed the
error immediately. Th.e Bell coun's argument would seem to appLy just as well to any tax shelter
deduction . Even a t11.1: expen cannot tell by looking at a large part:I\ership loss whether it is due to
a legitimate business or an abusive shelter.
In McRae (55 T .C.M. at 1560) . the div.orced housewife ne.ver saw any of the returns in
question until her divorce; her husband signed them for her. She did nat work outside the home
until the last year concerned, and in that year just gave him her W-2 , aSsuming he would take care
of the taxes . She was found to have no reason to know of her ex-husband's tax sbel!er deductions.
Similarly , in Bouskos (54 T .C.M . at 1117), a divorced housewife wilhout b~siness experience
signed the return without reading it and was relieved of liability for disallowed tax shelter losses
of$95,000.
120
897 F.2d at 441, aff'g 54 T.C.M. at 878.
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did not read the return. Curiously, the Tax Court did not cite its own
decision in Dowdy v. Comm'r, 121 which on identical facts (including the
minister/treasurer scenario of the husband's chapter of the ULC) went the
122
other way less than one year earlier.
123
In affl11Iling the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit in Guth was more
candid and held (as it did in Price) that the wife did have actual knowledge
of the transactions but that the test could not be imported literally from
the omission cases without consideration of other circumstances as well.
The wife must be in possession of enough facts (I) to put her on notice
that an understatement exists or (2) that would lead a reasonably prudent
person to make further inquiry. 124 ln Guth , the Ninth Circuit did indicate
that the acrual knowledge test remains appropriate for omission cases. Its
opinion was handed down one day after the Tax Court's Bokum decision.
Estate of Vella and Hayes: More Contradictions
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court make it appear that the
problem is merely whether the actual knowledge test can be imported
from omjssion cases to deduction cases without change, as if the rule in
omission cases were absolute. 125 That is far from the case, ho·w ever. The
Bokum coun did not mention its own earlier decision in Estate of
Vella, 126 which (unlike Quinn or Stevens) is directly on point as to the
actual knowledge issue. In Estate of Vella, the Tax Court gave relief to
52 T.C.M. 1192 (1986).
m The:only difference is the court ilid not believe Ms. Dowdy's s10ry Lhat she signed checks

IJI

simply because her husband asked her and that she wasintimidated by a domineering husband who
.kept her in the dark as to the nature of his activities.
Ill The government has not appealed Gwh to the U.S. Supreme Court and apparently does
not believe, correctly. that it creates a conflict with !h.e Slx!h and Eleventh Cin:uits any more than
Price did.
'" In Guth , such facts obviously did exist, bul both !he Tax Court and the Ninth Circuil chose
to ignore them. Ms. Goth participated in her husband's scheme for ar least the three years at issue
and was never told what the crossing of ¢hecks back-and fonh was supposed to accomplish . Also,
it scarcely seems credible Ihat her husband could have made her believe for such length of time
thaL his lrile purpose was religious in narure . Both couru mention Ms. Gulh's lack of education,
her husband's total control of their finances and ta:<;.es , and her dutifulness in carrying out .his
requests wilhoU! question. She was the Tax Court's !yp'e. Lack of higher education was Ihus
rewarded , as if it meWlt la.ck of capacity.
m Two significant questions were not discussed by either !he, Tax Court in Bokum or the
Ninth Circuit in Price . Taking Ihe extreme view that actual knowledge of a deduction's existence
en!llils \iabili!y. could that knowledge imelf be imputed ~olely from the wife's fallure to review !he
retum7 The answer appears to be sometimes yes . See Cohen, 54 T.C.M. at 944, discussed in the
text accompanying noLo: 93 supra. And sometimes no. See !he cases discussed in nme J 19 supra.
If not, should the wife who reatls the return be put in a worse position than the wife who ignores
Lhis duty'? These would be tricky questions if legal doctrin'e actually determined the outcome of
innocent spouse decisions, bur for the most pan. it does not.
120
43 T.C.M. at528.
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a widow who had' actual knowledge of her deceased husband's sales of
real estate that were not reported on the return. The McCoy doctrine was
mentioned but glossed over, and Ms. Vella was held to have no reason
to be put on notice because she left business and financial matters to her
husband, there were no unusual expenditures, and she did not know the
amounts for which the properties were sold. All of these factors were
also present in Bokum, but they failed to overcome the Tax Court's strict
application of McCoy. The real difference had nothing to do with legal
doctrine, however. Ms. Bokum was still married and wealthy whereas
Ms. Vella was a widow who seemed to need the court's help. 127
Less than eight months before the Bokum decision, the Tax Court
held in Hayes, 128 that a deserted wife who worked as a grocery clerk was
entitled to relief from tax on her husband's $14,510 earnings at SuperTherm, despite her actual knowledge of his employment there. Hayes
was secretive about finances and denied to her that he was employed
at Super-Therm, but she doubted his word and secretly verified his
employment there with representatives of the company (they would not
divulge the amount of his earnings, however). Ms. Hayes signed a blank
return, which her husband then had an accountant prepare and file without
her review. The court 129 did not discuss the McCoy line of cases but
instead found that she had no reason to know because her husband was
determined to keep her from participating in the preparation of the return.
Ms. Hayes would have risked his ire if she had asked to review the return,
and he probably would not have allowed her to see it in any event. 130
Relief was granted despite clear proof of actual knowledge of the taxable
transaction, together with actual knowledge of all relevant circumstances,
including actual knowledge of its taxability .

The Perfect Woman
This review of the case law concludes with some observations about
the decision in Ratana, 131 which involved another deserted wife. In
127
Ms. Vella was a housewife and mother who was not well educated. Her husband was
fifteen years older than she, and he took care of all Iheir finances, wilhout divulging !he nature of
his activities to her. In short, Ms. Vella appealed to the court and fit its predilection for reaching
out to the traditional family woman whose husband overreached, abandoned, or otherwise failed
her.
128
57 T.C.M. at 869.
129
Judge Whitaker, who did not participate in Bokum.
130
Nore Ihe inconsistency wilh Adams (60 T .C. at 300), discussed in the text accompanying
note 71 supra, where !he guilty wife's refusal to be fonhcoming about the couple's taxes was held
to put the husband on notice, even without any actual knowledge of her embezzling. It is notewonhy
that a woman can be rescued from a husband who stonewalls her, but a man in !he same situation
should have taken charge of the situation and filed his own return.
131
662 F.2d at 220, affg in part and rev'g in part 40 T.C.M. at 1119.
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RataM, perhaps more clearly than in any other case, the Tax Court's
selective application of its rules is glaringly obvious and so are its reasons
for leniency. The Tax Courrextols Ms. Ratana's wifely vinues as a sort
of silent explanation for its failure to aQPlY almost ali of its rules at
once. She exemplifies, almost to the point of caricature, the Tax Court's
preference for the traditional wife .
Ms . Ratana was born in the Philippines and her husband in Thailand .
She was brought up as a Seventh Day Adventist, for whom divorce is
unacceptable, and married a Thai, "knowing that in his culture a wife
submits to her husband without asking questions ." She worked as a
registered nurse and saved enough to buy a small property and to provide
for their four children •s education in religious schools . The husband
worked as a clerk and bookkeeper for the Royal Thai Embassy in Washington, D. C . He was also an importer of heroin from Thailand and a
compulsive gambler. 11"2
The husband, who prepared all their tax. returns, consistently omitted
his salary from the embassy each year because the embassy mistakenly
told him it was excludable. Ms . Ratana verified this for herself, and the
IRS agents accepted it as well after audits in two different years. In fact,
however, the income tax convention that provided for the exclusion relied
upon had never been ratified and was not in effect. The Tax Court gave
Ms. Ratana relief from this item after mentioning McCoy and that •·mere
ignorance of the law is no excuse" on the ground that she had made
reasonable inquiry - that is to say, precisely on the point over which it
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Price . 133
The IRS asserted a deficiency of $778,067 for the year·s in question,
almost entirely due to unreported profits from importing heroin. Ratana
pled guilty to income tax evasion, was given an eight-year sentence, and
fled to Thailand, apparently forever. In one of the years at issue, Ratana
gave his wife some $30,000 in cash (his salary was only some $7,000
per year), which she saved for the chlldren . She did not know of his drug
l l ! The hus.band w~ a member of GambAnon which encourages the gambler's spou~e to
assume financial responsibility for the family . It· also teaches that the spouse should never question
the gambler regarding finances and should accept any money offered by the gambler without
question.
"' The Coun of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to this Issue. despite the obvious
contradiction to the doctrine of McCoy (57 T.C. at 732). Ms. Ratana·s reasonable inquiry and
good-faith effort toward compl.iance is only evidence of.ber honest cban~oter. li remains the case
that sb~ ·knew al l the circumstances of his employment. Ms . McCoy had no reason to make ;my
inquiry. and it is no reflection on her chara.cter that she made mme. The unmentioned bat all
;mponant dife!lmce. one suspects. is that the Mr:Coys were married and living together at the time
of crial while Ms. Ramna was an abandoned wife and mother.
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trafficking and was told the money was from sales of property in Thailand,
where he made frequent trips. Ms. Ratana asked no questions and believed
that such income earned abroad was excludable. 134 In addition, the couple
spent several thousand dollars more each year than was reported for living
expenses each year. Ms. Ratana neither knew of nor profited from the
rest of his huge drug profits. The Tax Court exonerated her from everything135 on the grounds that she had a reasonable belief that the cash was
excludable(!), that the $30,000 cash gift was not extraordinary under the
circumstances(!), that the gift benefited her children rather than herself(!),
and that she had little financial experience(!). This decision, like Hayes,
could hardly be in plainer contradiction to the Tax Court's official McCoy
doctrine on actual knowledge. In addition, it is in flat contradiction to
two of the Tax Court's other basic factors ordinarily pointing to reason
to know (extraordinary expenditures and business experience), and in
addition, Ms. Ratana obviously benefited at least to the extent of the
$30,000 of cash. The court's real motive for these astonishing findings 136
appears in the last paragraph of the decision:
The record shows that Mr. Ratana was a compulsive gambler and often left
the country without notifying his family. On the other hand, Mrs. Ratana
was a hard-working, religious, and dutiful parent. Her primary concern was
her family. To earn extra money she often worked overtime and rarely took
a vacation. To hold Mrs. Ratana liable under these facts . ·.. would clearly
be inequitable.
The Tax Court had found its perfect woman.

Conclusion
The Tax Court is in irreconcilable conflict with its own precedents
much more than with the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit is in conflict
134
It seems more likely that she should have thought it was income from gambling, which
she should have known was taxable.
135
The Fourth Circuit drew the line at the $30,000 cash, however, as well as the expenses in
excess of reported income, and reversed the Tax Court as to these items, citing the actual knowledge
doctrine of McCoy (57 T.C. at 732). Relief was upheld as to the remainder of the drug profits,
which she had not received.
136
Each finding is contradicted by the reported facts. The author does not criticize the outcome
here and, in fact, would relieve all petitioners by repealing joint return liability altogether. What
is deplorable is that current law compels judges to intone such nonsense in order to reach an
equitable result. In this respect, we are in the same situation now as before the innocent spouse
rules were enacted, when the Sixth Circuit felt compelled to invent its sleight-of-hand relief in
Scudder (405 F.2d at 222) in order to reach the right result.
It is still more deplorable that more than one of the iules which the Tax Court broke here in
order to rescue Ms. Ratana were originally foniJUlated in order to impose liability on other women
who lost only because. they failed to dicit the Tax Court ' s sympathy. ·
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with its own stated version of the law. At the decisional level, the official
stated interpretations of the ,innocence and equity tests are garbled and do
not determine outcomes. Except for easy cases where the wife knowingly
participated in or obviously approved of and ratified her husband's tax
fraud, the cases seem to be decided according to subjective impressions
and personal values of the judges. The Tax Court's decisions Ieflect a
distinct reluctance to grant relief to women who are still married and a
noticeable preference for the traditional wifely role of the subservient
woman.
The Tax Court consciously should strive to overcome these preferences and treat all women equally. It would help the Tax Court to become
more aware of its preferences if it abandoned the explicit factors that
unconsciously help to justify and perperuate these preferences . The McCoy rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse should be abandoned and
so should the inherently prejudicial factors of education and business
experience as indicators of reason to know. These efforts should be made
in the direction of extending relief more generously.
But these suggestions are only a partial solution to one aspect of the
innocent spouse problem. If the best solution is not taken, wbich is
legislative repeal of joint return liability altogether, then Congress should
at least amend the innocent spouse provisions in order to extend relief
where the current rules appear arbitrary and unfair. Congress should (1)
repeal all the dollar limitations; (2) repeal the limitation to grossly erroneous items so that all tax items are eligible for relief, without limitation to
items having no basis in fact or law; (3) reverse the burden of proof so
that it is on the IRS as to the innocence and benefit tests; (4) require a
finding of both actual or constructive knowledge and benefit before
liability can be imposed; and (5) require the IRS to exhaust all avenues
of collection against the husband before attempting to collect from the
wife. Congress should also amend the rules in order to prevent the wife
from escaping taxes on her own income.
But even these amendments fal l short of the best solution, which is
repeal of joint return liability altogether. There will always be uncertainty
and unfairness in the law as long as the vague tests of innocence and
equity (or benefit) remain, even if the Tax Court becomes more aware of
its past preferences and consciously attempts to be more evenhanded.
There is no obvious way to redefine these tests so as to provide more
guidance to judges and ensure some degree of certainty in the decisional
law. And in the fmal analysis, there is no justification for these tests
because there is no satisfactory justification for imposing joint and several
liability in the first place. No otber industrialized country imposes such
a liability on women, and wherever it was once imposed, it has since
been repealed.Jt should be repealed in the United States as well.
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This article analyzes two recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
dealing with the deductibility of gifts or contributions to or for the use of
a qualified charitable organization.

Introduction
A charitable contribution is a "contribution or gift to or for the use
of ... a corporation, or foundation ... organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes." 1 Two of these statutory
requirements- "contribution or gift" and "to or for the use of'- have
been the subject of considerable controversy. Within the period of a year,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed each of these requirements
2
in separate decisions. This article examines these requirements in the
light of these decisions to determine to what extent the Court has resolved
the controversy and to what extent questions still remain unanswered.

Contribution or G~ft Requirement
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court examined a donor's intent to determine whether a transfer qualified as a gift. For example, in Comm'r v.
3
Duberstein, the_ Court concluded that "a gift . . . proceeds from a
detached and disinterested generosity. " 4 If the taxpayer made a donation
in anticipation of a benefit other than the personal satisfaction of giving,
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I.R.C. § 170(c). Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
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Hernandez v. Comm'r, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989); Davis v. United States, 90-1 U.S.T.C. ~
50,270 (U.S. 1990).
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363 u.s. 278 (1960).
4
/d. at 285 (quoting Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S . 243, 246 (1956)).
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